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Abstract
In the face of future uncertainties, many places are struggling with decisions about how
to prepare for and adapt to climate change. The purpose of this research is to shed light
on the concept of resilience, and uncover lessons for resilience-building exposed by a past
disaster, Hurricane Wilma.
The dissertation begins with an introduction (Chapter 1) detailing the research problem,
key terms and overall research design. The study was conducted in three distinct phases.
The first phase (Chapter 2), explored the concept of resilience to understand how it was
defined in three South Florida communities. Content analyses of city and county documents
were conducted to extract explicit definitions of resilience as well as implicit definitions based
on carefully selected keywords. Results showed the engineering resilience concept was most
prevalent across all three study areas. Furthermore, keywords related to the dimension of the
built environment were most common in Broward and Lee Counties. While this may indicate
a need for communities to shift toward more progressive, social-ecological conceptualizations
of resilience, a more central conclusion was that local applications of resilience frameworks
need to be more explicit about how they define resilience, and what resilience-building looks
like in that particular context.
Phase two (Chapter 3) explored the interplay between specified resilience, addressing
resistance to known disturbances, and general resilience, addressing a system’s capacity to
deal with less predictable shocks. This phase entailed a content analysis of 172 Sun-Sentinel
newspaper articles about Hurricane Wilma. Prominent themes that emerged included dis-
tribution of benefits and risks, social learning and memory, cross-scale issues, vulnerability
and social networks. This chapter concludes with four specific recommendations for Broward
vi
County to enhance resilience to future storms and less predictable disturbances, like climate
change and sea level rise.
During the third phase (Chapter 4) a modified resilience activation framework was ap-
plied to analyze social factors that may limit or promote adaptive capacity in South Florida.
Focus groups with homeowners were used to gain insight about past experiences with Hur-
ricane Wilma, as well as perceptions and expectations regarding local climate adaptation
e↵orts. Results showed that risk perceptions, insurance practices, and social networks may
influence the willingness and ability of individuals to prepare for and adapt to disasters.
Social limits to adaptation among participants included inaccurate risk perceptions based
on past experiences and feelings of helplessness, and a lack of political trust at the state
level. Social resources that can be leveraged to enhance adaptive capacity included knowl-
edge reserves of long-term residents, strong bonding capital, and trust in local, non-elected
government employees.
Results from each phase of research were synthesized to create a novel procedural
roadmap to guide how communities integrate resiliency into their planning documents.
vii
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research Problem
Studying the e↵ectiveness of climate change adaptation strategies is a challenge, since most
adaptation e↵orts are still in their planning or early implementation phases; However, places
that are particularly exposed to the physical e↵ects of sea level rise – like Broward County,
Florida – must act now to prepare for climate change impacts, even in the face of uncertainties
about the timing and extent of impacts, and the e↵ectiveness of various strategies.
The purpose of this research is to understand how Broward County can enhance its
resiliency to both known and uncertain hazards by investigating a past disaster experience,
Hurricane Wilma. More specifically, this research aims to answer the following questions:
1. How does Broward County conceptualize resilience at a local institutional level, and
how does this compare with other “resilient” communities?
2. What indicators, or surrogates, can be used to estimate resilience in Broward County?
3. How did attempts to address specified resilience after Hurricane Wilma influence, or
expose opportunities to improve, the general resilience of Broward County?
4. What social limits to adaptation exist in Broward County, and what are the opportu-
nities and challenges for overcoming those limits?
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1.2 Background
1.2.1 Resilience Framework for Disaster Management
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines resilience as “The capacity
of social, economic, and environmental systems to cope with a hazardous event or trend
or disturbance, responding or reorganizing in ways that maintain their essential function,
identity, and structure, while also maintaining the capacity for adaptation, learning, and
transformation” (IPCC, 2014b). By incorporating adaptive capacity and transformation
into their definition, the IPCC’s meaning is distinct from earlier concepts of resilience that
were characterized by a system’s ability to return back to some equilibrium state after a
disturbance (Table 1.1).
Table 1.1: Resilience concepts as synthesized by Folke (2006).
Resilience Concept Characteristics Focus On
- Engineering - Return time, e ciency - Recovery, constancy
- Ecosystem,
Ecological, Social
- Bu↵er capacity, withstand
shock, maintain function
- Persistence,
robustness
- Social-Ecological,
Adaptive, Structural
- Interplay disturbance and
reorganization, sustaining &
developing
- Adaptive capacity,
transformability,
learning, innovation
The shift toward framing resilience through a social-ecological lens focusing on adaptive
capacity and transformation came about partially due to the recognition that recovery and
persistence of ecological systems or social systems may not be desirable or sustainable, for
instance in the case of polluted water supplies or persistent dictatorships (Carpenter et al.,
2001). According to Nelson et al. (2007), using a resilience framework to study climate
change is highly appropriate due to its emphasis on long-term trajectories and change. They
explain, “A resilience framework contributes to our understanding of how individual actions
2
a↵ect overall systems, when a system is likely to encounter a threshold, and how thresholds
may be navigated” (p.113).
In the context of urban disaster risk, Zaidi and Pelling (2013) also engage with the
concept of resilience by stressing an understanding of vulnerability as a dynamic process
which incorporates “critical reflection, learning pathways and experimentation as determi-
nants of resilience coproduced through vulnerability” (p.3). This understanding is reflected
in their disaster resilience model, which frames disaster resilience as a combined function of
risk identification, risk reduction, disaster response, and adaptive capacity (Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1: Disaster Resilience Model by Zaidi and Pelling (2013).
.
In this study, resilience is a useful conceptual framework because it helps determine
how responses to problems are identified, influencing the types of responses that should be
explored to promote desirable outcomes (Adger et al., 2011). A resilience framework also
emphasizes the need for societies to reflect on their values and priorities now and in the
future (Nelson, 2011). Once a future trajectory is chosen, “Adaptations are the steps we
take to get there” (Nelson, 2011, p.118).
3
1.2.2 Adaptation, Adaptive Capacity, and Resilience
Along with the concept of resilience, adaptive capacity, adaptation and vulnerability are
central ideas in discussions about hazards like climate change, and the four terms are often
conflated (Gallopin, 2006; Smit and Wandel, 2006). The IPCC defines adaptation as, “The
process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its e↵ects.” They continue, “In
human systems, adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportu-
nities. In some natural systems, human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected
climate and its e↵ects” (IPCC, 2014).
Yet, while the ability to adapt (adaptive capacity) is essential when using a resilience
framework, the adaptation actions people take in response to a problem can just as easily un-
dermine resilience as support it (Nelson, 2011). For instance, in climate adaptation, there are
at least five pathways that can increase, rather than decrease vulnerability, or susceptibility
to harm. These include actions which 1) increase greenhouse gas emissions; 2) dispropor-
tionately burden the most vulnerable; 3) have high opportunity costs; 4) reduce incentives
to adapt; or 5) create path dependency, thereby reducing adaptive capacity (Brown, 2011).
However, in climate change adaptation, adaptive actions have rarely been evaluated since
most have only been initiated (Bierbaum et al., 2014). This research will help fill that gap
by exploring adaptations taken after a hurricane, and then determining how the e↵ectiveness
of those actions, and the processes for selecting them, can inform resiliency strategies and
future adaptive capacities.
1.3 Terminology Overview
Many of the key concepts explored in this dissertation are described using terminology
common in colloquial language, yet frequently debated in academic literature. As such,
this section provides a brief overview of some frequently used words and phrases for the sake
of clarity.
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First, the term resilience is central to this research. While each chapter cites one or
more definitions relevant to the particular research objectives, the holistic, social-ecological
approach to resilience is of primary interest to this work. Social-ecological resilience refers
to a system’s capacity to respond and adapt to both short term and long term disturbances
to enhance social, ecological and economic well-being and reduce social and physical vulner-
abilities. This concept considers cross-scale interactions, acknowledging that ‘communities’,
however defined, are made up of smaller components while at the same time comprising
larger systems.
While scholars like Gallopin (2006) and Cutter et al. (2008) caution against defining
resilience as the opposite of vulnerability, this research contends that the two concepts are
intrinsically linked such that resilient communities tend to be less vulnerable to disturbances.
While exposure to hazards can potentially increase resilience by providing knowledge and
experience about how to cope and adapt, vulnerability also encompasses sensitivity (the
degree of impact) and capacity of response (immediate coping ability).
Hence, vulnerability is influenced by social-ecological resilience, which is determined by
a number of present and future components (Figure 1.2). Present conditions that influence
overall vulnerability and social-ecological resilience include a system’s current exposure and
sensitivity to risk, as well as current capacity for response (i.e., preparedness to cope with
the immediate impacts of a disaster) and current adaptive capacity (i.e., ability for a system
to make changes to better prepare for future disturbances). In a resilient social-ecological
system, adaptive capacity should exceed the capacity for immediate response (Gallopin,
2006). Adaptive capacity, which can include various elements of risk identification and
reduction, learning and governance (Paterson et al., 2017), is one of the primary factors that
shapes adaptive actions and strategies. These present conditions then influence longer time
scales by increasing or reducing future risks, vulnerabilities, and capacities to adapt.
5
Figure 1.2: Visual overview of terminology commonly used in this dissertation
.
1.4 Research Design
This research was conducted using a case study research design. Case study designs are
often employed to study complex issues due to their ability to capture detailed contextual
information about interconnected social, economic and biophysical systems. This approach
provides a “detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test
historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events” (George and Bennett,
2005). To gain a deeper understanding of Broward County’s past disaster experience and
resiliency strategies, research was conducted in three phases.
First, to decipher how Broward County conceptualizes and plans for resilience, a content
analysis of o cial documents was conducted, and then compared with content analyses for
two other purportedly “resilient” communities: Lee County and the City of Punta Gorda.
6
All three of these communities were highlighted by the Florida Chapter of the American
Planning Association as having exemplary resiliency strategies (APA Florida, 2016); There-
fore, comparing these communities’ definitions and strategies for resilience-building provided
lessons about how resilience might be operationalized in di↵erent contexts.
For the second phase, a content analysis of newspaper articles about Hurricane Wilma
helped identify how storm recovery could influence e↵orts to improve general community
resilience in Broward County. Because the media has been shown to influence civic agenda-
setting (Williams, 2003), this analysis provided another pertinent perspective of local values
and priorities in the context of post-disaster recovery and redevelopment.
During the third and final phase of research, a series of focus groups were conducted with
homeowners in three Broward cities to gain insight about their past experiences with natural
disasters, as well as their perceptions and expectations regarding local climate adaptation
e↵orts. The focus group analysis provided insight about social resources in these cities that
could limit adaptability or sustainable adaptation.
Each of these three phases is a published or to-be-published manuscript, and is rep-
resented by a chapter in the dissertation (Figure 1.3). For each of these publications, the
PhD candidate was the lead author, and was principally responsible for the literature review,
research design and methods, data collection, analysis, and interpretation and writing.
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Figure 1.3: Schematic of dissertation chapters as they relate to research questions identified
in section 1.1.
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Chapter 2
What It Means to Become ‘More Resilient’:
An Analysis of Local Resilience Building Approaches in Three Florida Communities
2.1 Introduction
During the Atlantic hurricane seasons of 2004 and 2005, an astonishing fifteen named storms
made landfall in the United States, setting a number of records for the quantity and mag-
nitude of tropical cyclones (NOAA, 2005, 2006). Perhaps due in part to this unprecedented
meteorological activity, the term resilience has become prominent in fields such as disas-
ter management and global environmental change, as seen in reports such as the National
Academies’ “Disaster Resilience: A National Imperative” (National Academies, 2012). First
emerging as a concept in ecology, C.S. Holling (1973) defined resilience as “a measure of the
persistence of systems and their ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain
the same relationships between populations or state variables” (p.14). Since then, resilience
has been increasingly applied as a framework to manage future uncertainties in complex
social-ecological systems, which consist of a resource system along with its users and gov-
ernance systems (Folke, 2006; Garmestani and Benson, 2013; Nelson et al., 2007; Ostrom,
2007). This transition toward more social applications has led to multiple interpretations
of the concept, creating challenges for implementing resilience frameworks at local scales
(Davidson et al., 2016; Fisichelli et al., 2016). For example, if one interprets resilience as the
ability to quickly return to some original condition, then a community could be considered
resilient even if it returns to an unsustainable or vulnerable condition following a disturbance.
However, if one interprets resilience as integrating elements of change and adaptability, the
*To cite this chapter: Torres, H., Alsharif, K. (2017). What It Means to Become ‘More Resilient’: An
Analysis of Local Resilience Building Approaches in Three Florida Communities. Weather, Climate, and
Society. DOI: 10.1175/WCAS-D-16-0101.1. c American Meteorological Society. Used with Permission.
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same community would be considered non-resilient for its inability to transform to a more
desirable condition.
Despite some ambiguity of the concept, resilience is often held up as a “holy grail” for
which environmental managers at multiple levels should strive. For instance, at a national
level in the United States, federal agencies are now required by Executive Order to inte-
grate resilience into international development programs; the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development launched a $1 billion National Disaster Resilience Competition for
cities; The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) released a “U.S. Cli-
mate Resilience Toolkit”; USAID announced a Global Resilience Partnership; and President
Obama initiated a Task Force on Climate Preparedness and Resilience (White House O ce
of the Press Secretary, 2016). The list of resilience-building initiatives could stretch on. At
this grand scale, resilience tends to be defined rather abstractly, which may facilitate its
flexibility for context-specific applications at local scales. The National Academies’ report,
for example, defines resilience as “The ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from,
or more successfully adapt to actual or potential adverse events” (National Academies, 2012,
p. 16), which aligns with national and international definitions (UNISDR, 2011; SDR, 2005;
DHS Risk Steering Committee, 2008; NRC, 2011). Yet, this description does little to inform
local governments whether resilience-building should prioritize resistance to or acceptance
of change in the face of disturbance. Moreover, it leaves open the idea of what it means to
“more successfully adapt.”
Research has shown that narratives of resilience can be empowering, and a community
that self-identifies as resilient and self-reliant is more likely to respond proactively to dis-
turbances than one that self-identifies as vulnerable (Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012). However,
this begs the question of whether such a response is due to the framing of the problem or due
to a certain set of resilient practices or characteristics. Some scholars, like Benson and Craig
(2014), fear that at its current stage of development, “resilience is in danger of becoming [...]
a rhetorical device with little influence on actual decision making” (p.780).
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The National Academies report (2012) and other academic literature (Brand and Jax,
2007; Cutter et al., 2008; Davidson et al., 2016; Gunderson et al., 2010; Garmestani and
Benson, 2013) have made extensive e↵orts to categorize di↵erent types of resilience and
make recommendations for implementing resilience frameworks in complex social-ecological
systems. However, little has been done to understand how practitioners, particularly at
local levels of governance, conceptualize resilience (Aldunce et al., 2015). This type of
understanding is critical considering the relevance of cross-scale dynamics in much resilience
literature (see for example, Gunderson and Holling 2002; Folke et al. 2003; Carlsson and
Berkes 2005; Garmestani and Benson 2013; Sundstrom et al. 2014).
The purpose of this research is to assess and compare how localities define resilience in
order for larger scale resilience-building e↵orts to more e↵ectively frame their resilience goals.
Toward this aim, our research investigates how the concept of resilience is being used in lo-
cal government documents in three Florida communities in order to: 1) better understand
what resilience ideal type (engineering, ecosystem or social-ecological resilience) resonates
most prominently; and 2) determine which dimensions of resilience (social dimensions, built
environment, economic development, population and governance) are being prioritized in
planning, and how they are being balanced. As communities are acting locally to reach
goals set at larger scales (like building national resilience), research like this is imperative so
communities can ensure that they are, indeed, working toward a common vision of national
resilience, even though local strategies may vary. For example, infrastructure hardening, like
modifying sea walls to withstand more extreme storms, may be a local resilience strategy.
Yet, if not adequately complemented by longer-term strategies like enhancing multi-level gov-
ernance, infrastructure hardening may do little to enhance a community’s ability to contend
with unanticipated disturbances.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 provides a background
and justification of the resilience ideal types and dimensions being analyzed. Section 2.3
describes the methods used for a content analysis of local government documents. Section
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2.4 presents the results of this research along with discussion points, and section 2.5 concludes
the chapter, providing recommendations for the local application of resilience concepts.
2.2 Resilience Ideal Types and Dimensions
Resilience is often categorized into two or more basic ideal types (Brand and Jax, 2007;
Davidson et al., 2016; Folke, 2006; Gunderson et al., 2010; Holling, 1996; Walker et al.,
2004). Building o↵ Folke (2006), this research emphasizes three basic types of resilience:
engineering, ecosystem, and social-ecological.
2.2.1 Engineering Resilience
Engineering resilience is generally thought to be the most narrow, short-term interpretation
of the resilience concept, and refers to how quickly a social-ecological system can return to
a single steady-state, or equilibrium, following a disturbance event (Holling, 1996). In other
words, this interpretation implies a desirability to “bounce back” to some initial condition
or state. Engineering resilience tends to view nature as balanced, emphasizing resistance
to change, conservation of the status-quo, and the prediction and management of resources
for the sake of optimal production (Folke, 2006; Gunderson and Holling, 2002). Managing
for engineering resilience often entails imposing static goals on dynamic systems to reach
social, economic or engineering objectives, causing them to be “more spatially uniform,
less functionally diverse, and more sensitive to disturbances that otherwise could have been
absorbed” (Holling, 1996, p.36). This type of resilience tends to give little attention to the
frequency and extent of disturbances, or to the spatial heterogeneity of systems (O’Neill,
1998).
2.2.2 Ecosystem/Ecological/Social Resilience
Ecosystem resilience (which integrates ideas from ecological and social resilience) moves
away from the single steady-state paradigm toward a complex adaptive systems approach
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(Folke, 2006). This conceptualization acknowledges the unpredictable, dynamic, and process-
dependent nature of ecosystems, favoring regeneration, renewal and reorganization over re-
covery (Bellwood et al., 2004; Folke, 2006). According to Levin (1998), complex adaptive
systems, which can include coral reefs, urban coastal zones, or any other large assemblage
of living and nonliving entities, are di cult to model and predict because higher level pro-
cesses are driven by localized interactions. This means local actors have some agency to
e↵ect change in larger social, economic and environmental structures from the bottom-up,
reducing predictability.
While Levin’s (1998) conceptualization of ecosystem resilience emphasizes heterogene-
ity, it also continues to assume resistance to change as the overarching goal of resilience,
describing resilience as becoming better “bu↵ered to changes” (p. 431).
A number of essential elements have been identified to enhance ecosystems’ capacities
to withstand shock and maintain function in the face of disturbance. These include diversity,
individuality of individual components, continual adaptation, and cross-cutting hierarchical
organization (Levin, 1998; Janssen and De Vries, 1998; Folke, 2006). Whereas engineering
resilience approaches to disaster management would likely prioritize the need to build back
quickly after a disturbance, ecosystem resilience approaches would prioritize the need to
build back better, promoting diversity of ecological systems, institutions, and livelihoods
and improving bu↵er capacity, or the ability to withstand disaster impacts in the first place
(Adger et al., 2011; Aldunce et al., 2015).
2.2.3 Social-ecological/Adaptive Resilience/Structural resilience
Social-ecological resilience is the broadest resilience ideal type explored in this research.
Advancing from Holling’s earlier work on ecological resilience, regarding the ability to absorb
disturbance, the adaptive renewal heuristic model is a useful tool for understanding resilience
from a social-ecological perspective.
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This model of ecosystem dynamics is premised on four phases of development: Periods
of rapid change (exploitation, or r phase), periods of growing rigidity (conservation, or K
phase), periods of readjustment or “creative destruction” (the release or ⌦ phase), and pe-
riods of renewal (reorganization or ↵) (Gunderson and Holling, 2002). While management
strategies in the engineering and ecosystem resilience paradigms have focused on the exploita-
tion and conservation phases of development, social-ecological resilience approaches recognize
destruction and reorganization as equally important elements of development (Gunderson
and Holling, 2002; Folke, 2006).
Hence, social-ecological resilience acknowledges the necessity and inevitability of distur-
bance in ecosystems, and promotes management strategies that balance resistance to change
with the need to take advantage of opportunities for desirable transitions that may open
up during or after a disturbance (Folke, 2006; Walker et al., 2004; Smit and Wandel, 2006).
So while bu↵er capacity and ecosystem resilience are also important in a social-ecological
resilience framework, this ideal type also emphasizes flexibility and adaptiveness (as opposed
to adaptedness) (Folke, 2006). Social learning, self-organization, collaborative research and
management, and transformability are some key components of social-ecological resilience
(Folke, 2006; Lambin, 2005).
2.2.4 Four Dimensions of Resilience
In an e↵ort to bridge the gap between conceptualizations of resilience at national and local
scales, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)’s Science and Technol-
ogy Policy Institute developed a report about how various communities are implementing
resilience approaches into their local governments (Gupta et al., 2016). In the NIST report,
four dimensions of resilience were synthesized from previous research, including Cutter et
al.’s (2008) Disaster Resilience of Place (DROP) model and Norris et al.’s (2008) theory
of community resilience, and then indicators for each dimension were constructed and ana-
lyzed. Cutter et al.’s (2008) DROP model emphasizes social resilience to natural hazards,
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representing the association between vulnerability and resilience. Adger (2000) defines social
resilience as communities’ ability to cope with impacts of social, political or environmental
change. While it is clear that vulnerability and resilience are related concepts, the nature of
their relationship tends to be ill-defined. According to Gallopin (2006), vulnerability is best
considered in terms of changes in a system, while resilience is an internal attribute. The
theory of community resilience poses that communities build resilience by reducing risks
and resource inequalities, while enhancing local engagement and flexibility to “plan for not
having a plan” (Norris 2007, p. 127). The four dimensions include population and gover-
nance, economics, built environment, and social dimensions. Keywords, or codes, for each
dimension of resilience were adapted from Gupta et al.’s (2016) report (Table 2.1). Because
social-ecological systems emphasize the interaction between natural resource systems and
their users, “environment” is not represented as its own dimension, but is instead tied into
the terms representing the other more human-oriented dimensions. According to Gupta et al.
(2016), all of these dimensions must be considered when assessing a community’s resilience
to any unanticipated disturbance, whether it be human or natural.
2.3 Methods
2.3.1 Research Design
This research uses content analysis of government documents, presentations and reports to
address the research question of how resilience is being defined, conceptualized and applied
in three Florida communities. Similar to a discourse analysis, this work explores various
“storylines” about resilience to uncover how meaning is given to the concept either explicitly
or through contextual clues (Aldunce et al., 2015). However, since this study is looking
strictly at how the term is defined and used in a particular set of documents rather than
across a variety of practices and contexts, content analysis more appropriately describes the
method used here.
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Table 2.1: Four Dimensions of Resilience with search terms, or codes, used to represent
each. Adapted from IDA Science and Technology Policy Institute Resilience Analysis. Table
adapted from Gupta et al. (2016).
Population & Gov. Economics Built Environment Social
- Municipal Gov. - GDP - Built Environment - Vulnerable
- City Government - Income - Energy - Children
- Population - Per Capita - Power - Elderly
- Funding - Employment - Natural Gas - Foreign
- Budget - Jobs - Liquid Fuels - Disability
- Industry - Water - Senior Citizens
- Property Values - Wastewater - Uninsured
- Economy - Transportation - Unemployed
- Roads - Religion
- Bridges and Tunnels - Crime Rate
- Public Transit - Voter
- Maritime - Food
- Communications - Education
- Housing - Income
- Hospitals
Broward County, Lee County and the City of Punta Gorda were selected as the study
areas for this research since these communities are exposed to risks from both slow-onset
disasters (e.g., climate change, sea level rise), and fast-onset disasters (e.g., hurricanes, flood-
ing, coastal erosion), and because the Florida Chapter of the American Planning Association
(APA) highlighted these three places on their website as having exemplary plans for creating
more resilient communities (APA Florida, 2016) (Figure 2.1).
For instance, Broward has its own Division of Environmental Planning and Community
Resilience, and received a grant from NOAA and the Florida Department of Environmen-
tal Protection called “Working Toward Resilient Coastal Communities.” Broward County
has also collaboratively created a vision for climate resilience, and has worked with a re-
gional climate compact to host multiple Resilient Redesign workshops, where “experts and
stakeholders developed potential design solutions to the evolving urban challenges of climate
change and natural hazards” (SFRCCC, 2015). Yet, these communities’ definitions and per-
ceptions of resilience guide the choices they make for becoming more resilient. Therefore,
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Figure 2.1: Location of study areas
.
this research seeks to understand local conceptualizations of the term, and determine how
local definitions align with national and international definitions.
2.3.2 Document and Segment Selection
To understand how communities conceptualize resilience at a local scale, local government
documents were collected for analysis of resilience definitions. Documents were selected by
conducting a web search of all PDF documents on the counties’ or city’s o cial websites. For
example, in Broward County the search included all PDFs from www.broward.org with the
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terms “Broward County” AND any form of the word “resilient.” Because the most recent
hurricane to make landfall in Florida was Hurricane Wilma on October 24, 2005, documents
were selected from that date through the date the search took place (March 24, 2016).
The initial search for Broward County yielded one-hundred three documents of various
lengths. Duplicate results were excluded, along with meeting minutes and agendas. Doc-
uments were also excluded if the only occurrence of the term resilience was in the phrase
“Environmental Planning and Community Resilience Division,” referring to an agency lo-
cated within Broward’s Department of Environmental Protection and Growth Management.
After these exclusions, sixty-three documents (over three-thousand three-hundred pages) re-
mained for analysis in Broward County, including various reports, elements of the county
Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, planning documents and drafts for discussion,
presentations, and city-level vulnerability assessment reports.
The initial document searches for Lee County and the City of Punta Gorda yielded
far fewer results, with eight and seventeen documents, respectively, which may be due to
their smaller sizes and populations. According to the 2010 U.S. census, Broward comprises
thirty-one municipalities and nearly 1.9 million residents, compared to Lee County which
has only six cities and about one-third the population. The City of Punta Gorda is a
single municipality with a population just over 17,000. Yet, despite di↵erences in size and
population, the three communities face similar risks, share similar climatic conditions, and
have developed plans for resilience, making a comparison valid.
For Lee County and Punta Gorda, duplicate documents were also excluded along with
those where the only occurrence of the word resilience was in the context of “resilient-seated
shuto↵ valves,” referring to sprinkler system requirements. Furthermore, since neither the
website for Lee County nor Punta Gorda provided access to the plans highlighted by APA
Florida, the City of Punta Gorda Adaptation Plan (2009) and the Lee County Climate
Change Resiliency Strategy (2010) were sought out manually for inclusion in the analysis.
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In the end, seven documents were included for Lee County (over one-thousand eight-hundred
pages) and eight for Punta Gorda (nearly eight-hundred sixty pages).
These documents were imported into a qualitative data analysis software (MAXQDA),
where a lexical search was performed to locate each instance where the word (or any form
of the word) resilience appeared. Then, each paragraph where the word resilience appeared
was extracted by hand (in presentations, the entire page, or slide) for further analysis, except
when the context could not be determined (for example, in presentations that listed the word
resilience as a bullet point, without any further explanation). These extracted paragraphs
and presentation slides are referred to hereafter as “segments.” In all, two-hundred thirty-
four segments including a form of the word resilience were extracted for analysis in Broward
compared to ninety-five segments in Lee County – many of which contained more than one
instance of the resilience – and only twenty-four segments in Punta Gorda.
2.3.3 Coding Scheme
To begin, segments were manually scanned to parse out any explicit definitions of resilience
provided within. Next, a coding scheme was developed for the resilience ideal types using
carefully selected keywords in order to provide context clues about what resilience ideal types
and/or dimensions were being emphasized in the segments (Table 2.2). Keywords were drawn
from definitions of the resilience ideal types found in academic literature (Bellwood et al.,
2004; Folke, 2006; Gunderson and Holling, 2002; Holling, 1996; Janssen and De Vries, 1998;
Lambin, 2005; Levin, 1998; O’Neill, 1998; Smit and Wandel, 2006; Walker et al., 2004).
Seventeen keywords, or “subcodes” were chosen for each resilience ideal type. For most
keywords, all grammatical forms were searched within the segments, and in some cases
synonyms were also searched and coded. For instance, “integrative science” was a keyword
for the social-ecological resilience ideal type. Segments were searched for all forms of the
word integrative, as well as for various spellings and hyphenations of interdisciplinary and
multidisciplinary.
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Table 2.2: Resilience ideal types with keywords or “codes” used for analysis. Table adapted
from Folke (2006).
Resilience
Ideal Type
Characteristics Focus On Keywords “Codes” for Analysis
Engineering Return time,
e ciency
Recovery,
constancy
armor, constancy of system,
control, e ciency of function,
equilibrium, expert-led, fortify,
harden, predict, rebound,
recovery, regulate, resistance,
restoration, return time,
stability/stable state, top-down
Ecosystem,
Ecological,
Social
Bu↵er capacity,
withstand shock,
maintain function
Persistence,
robustness
absorb, adaptability, bu↵er,
complex, conserve, diversity,
ecosystem, unstable/instability,
maintain, persist, preserve,
regenerate, renew, reorganize,
robust, sustain, withstand
Social-
Ecological,
Adaptive,
Structural
Interplay
disturbance and
reorganization,
sustaining &
developing
Adaptive
capacity, trans-
formability,
learning,
innovation
adaptive capacity, adaptive
management, change,
collaborate, coordinate,
cross-scale/multilevel, dynamic,
innovation,
integrative/interdisciplinary,
knowledge-sharing, learning,
opportunity, renewal, self-
organization/decentralization,
sustainable development,
transform, transition
If certain keywords were used in the same paragraph as the term resilience, the as-
sumption was that those concepts were either implicitly or explicitly being linked to the
concept of resilience, providing evidence of how resilience was being conceptualized. After
keywords were searched, they were automatically coded and then manually read to deter-
mine their context and usage within the segments. Although some keywords had zero hits
in the resilience segments, the terms remained part of the coding scheme since the absence
of a keyword can provide as much information as the presence of one.
After documenting the occurrence of keywords related to each resilience ideal type, a
second coding scheme was developed to determine what dimensions of resilience were most
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prominently emphasized in each community. This coding scheme used keywords, or sub-
codes, adapted from Gupta et al.’s (2016) indicators of the four dimensions of resilience,
shown in Table 2.1. In this case, each dimension had a di↵erent number of keywords, with
population and governance having the least (five), and built environment the most (seven-
teen). Economics and social dimensions had eight and fifteen keywords, respectively. To
account for this variation, data about resilience dimensions were analyzed using normalized
frequencies.
2.4 Results & Discussion
2.4.1 Definitions of Resilience
This research set out to understand how di↵erent types of resilience were being defined and
conceptualized at local levels in three Florida communities. While there was an expectation
that explicit definitions of resilience may be few, and that definitions would likely emphasize
resistance to change, a surprising result of this research was that only one of the study areas,
Lee County, provided any explicit definition for resilience, despite all three places citing
resilience as a major goal in planning documents, policies and presentations.
Lee County’s 2010 Climate Change Resiliency Strategy (CCRS) was created as the
second component of a contract with the Southwest Florida Regional Planning Council,
with the first component being a Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment. The CCRS
was exceptional in that it not only defined resilience but di↵erentiated between ecological
resilience, climate change resilience and system resilience, and moreover, explained the re-
lationship between resilience and adaptation (Table 2.3). After defining these and other
terms in the introduction, the CCRS outlined seven elements considered desirable for any
resilience plan. These included flexibility from individual to systemic levels; a multi-faceted
skill set; redundancy of processes, capacities and response pathways; collaborative, multi-
sector approaches to planning, execution and recovery; planning and foresight to prepare
for identified risks; diversity and decentralization of planning, response and recovery e↵orts;
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and plans for failure, “so that break-downs happen gracefully, not catastrophically” (Beever
et al., 2010, pp.13-14). These elements clearly reflect principles of social-ecological resilience,
acknowledging the inevitability of the destruction and reorganization phases in Gunderson
and Holling’s (2002) adaptive renewal cycle model.
Lee County went on to call their resilience strategies “alternatives to consider” (Beever
et al., 2010, p.11), and these strategies were influenced both from the top-down and bottom-
up. Using the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s recommendations for resilience plan-
ning, Lee County’s resiliency strategy described particular implementation actions, summa-
rized how actions were selected and prioritized, communicated with stakeholders and decision
makers, and created a plan to monitor and evaluate results (Beever et al., 2010). However,
the specific strategy areas and actions included in the document were determined through
stakeholder surveys and interviews, providing locally-relevant perspectives.
In Broward County, none of the two-hundred thirty-four segments mentioning the word
resilience provided an explicit definition. In fact, seven of the documents mentioning re-
silience were cities’ sea-level rise vulnerability assessments, created in 2014-2015 as part of
the “Working Toward Resilient Coastal Communities” grant. However, no segments were
extracted from these reports at all, since none mentioned resilience aside from two subtitles
referencing the grant. On the other hand, the seven reports did mention some form of the
word “vulnerable” a total of six hundred forty-five times.
This finding was notable given warnings from scholars like Susan Cutter who caution
against positioning vulnerability as the opposite of resilience, since doing so may imply
that vulnerable people or places lack resilience, rather than viewing resilience as a strategy
or resource that can be developed (Cutter et al., 2008; Toma, 2014). While vulnerability
assessments are essential for identifying people and places that are at risk, it is equally im-
portant to recognize measures vulnerable groups can take to increase their resilience (Toma,
2014). As such, vulnerability assessments should be conducted in conjunction with resilience
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Table 2.3: Key definitions exactly as provided in Lee County’s 2010 Climate Change Re-
siliency Strategy
Term Definition/Explanation
Climate change adaptation An adjustment in natural or human systems in
response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or
their e↵ects, an adjustment that moderates harm or
exploits beneficial opportunities. (pp.13, 141)
Climate change resilience The capacity of an individual, community, or
institution to dynamically and e↵ectively respond to
shifting climate impact circumstances while
continuing to function at an acceptable level. It is
the ability to survive, recover from, and/or live with
the e↵ects of climate change. It includes the ability
to understand potential impacts and to take
appropriate action before, during, and after a
particular consequence to minimize negative e↵ects
and maintain the ability to respond to changing
conditions. (pp.13, 141)
Resilience (in Ecology) Building the capacity of a system to withstand
perturbations and shocks and to rebuild and respond
to change, including unanticipated change. Resilience
(in Planning) as the capacity of a system to absorb
disturbance, undergo change and still retain
essentially the same function, structure, identity, and
feedbacks. (pp.13, 141)
System resilience Resilience is not simply the result of adding up
resilient individuals. The uncertain nature of climate
impacts means that no one individual or institution
can possibly prepare for, or recover from, all of the
potential scenarios. Therefore, resilient systems are
required. Systems are combinations of resources,
institutions, individuals, and processes that combine
to accomplish a set of specific functions. To achieve
resilience, systems build redundancies of resources,
multiple response paths, and safety nets. (p.15)
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plans whenever possible, to emphasize communities’ agency to reduce potential future risks
(as was done in Lee County).
At the other end of the spectrum, a 2012 Regional Climate Action Plan, created by
Broward and three other counties as part of a regional climate compact, mentioned the word
resilience over forty times, which was more than any other single document. The plan claims
it “creates a common vocabulary [...] to e↵ectively communicate the steps from risk to
resilience with the general public, voters, elected o cials and decision makers in Southeast
Florida, the state and the nation.” (SFRCCC, 2012, p.v), seemingly recognizing the need
to use clear, consistent terminology. Yet, the plan consistently included calls to “create,”
“maintain,” “improve,” “enhance,” “increase,” “maximize” or “move toward” resilience,
without any explicit definition of the term.
The plan does identify several focal areas under which one hundred ten action steps
are categorized, which could provide insight about how resilience is perceived. These areas
included: providing a common framework for sustainable communities and transportation
planning; protecting and addressing vulnerable water supplies, management and infrastruc-
ture; preserving natural and agricultural systems; decreasing energy and fuel consumption;
integrating climate change hazards into risk reduction and emergency management; and cre-
ating a common vocabulary for outreach and public policy (SFRCCC, 2012). Unlike Lee
County, which balanced preparing for known risks with preparing for unanticipated distur-
bances, Broward appeared to emphasize known vulnerabilities and specific risks.
Other segments of the 2012 Climate Action Plan, from Broward County’s website, pro-
vided additional insight into how resilience was being conceptualized:
“[The Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact] respects the diver-
sity of the region and the autonomy of the many governing bodies.” (SFRCCC,
2012, p.1)
“The regional scale of the resilience strategies e↵ectively integrate human and
natural systems” (SFRCCC, 2012, p.1)
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Referenced in these quotations, diversity and human-natural system integration are
common themes in ecosystem resilience frameworks; whereas, collaboration and autonomy of
governing bodies are concepts often seen in social-ecological resilience. Thus, one could infer
that the 2012 Regional Climate Action Plan may look toward resilience-building strategies
that balance goals from ecosystem and social-ecological resilience frameworks.
While the City of Punta Gorda was not as explicit as Lee County in defining resilience, its
Comprehensive Plan generally stated that “climate resiliency planning provides a planning
framework for addressing the physical, economic, environmental, and social impacts that
changes in climate are expected to have on the City of Punta Gorda” (City of Punta Gorda,
2016a, p.2B-26). This definition is reminiscent of definitions for sustainability that use the
“triple bottom line approach” to address economic, environmental, and social factors in
planning, although physical impacts are also added to the equation.
In their adaptation plan, Punta Gorda outlines five general objectives for addressing
climatic changes: 1) increase robustness of infrastructure; 2) promote flexibility in man-
aged systems; 3) enhance adaptability of vulnerable natural areas; 4) reduce trends that
increase vulnerability, like overdeveloping coasts; and 5) improve education and awareness
(Beever et al., 2009; Klein and Tol, 1997). Like Lee County, Punta Gorda identified local
vulnerabilities and adaptation actions through participatory processes, including workshops
where attendees played vulnerability, adaptation, and acceptability games which helped
group members analyze alternative actions and locations for their implementation.
Hence, based on the explicit and implicit definitions of resilience found in local doc-
uments, there are some initial di↵erences in how each study area uses the term. In Lee
County, definitions are deliberate and explicit, tending toward the social-ecological resilience
paradigm and accepting uncertainty and flexibility as central tenets for planning. Broward
County uses the term resilience frequently, yet somewhat generically, without apparent crit-
ical reflection of its multiple meanings. Furthermore, Broward’s explanations of resilience
are more focused on preparing for known risks than uncertain futures. The City of Punta
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Gorda tends to emphasize adaptation more than resilience in their documents, though their
objectives for addressing climate change reflect many of the principles of social-ecological
resilience, like promoting flexibility and adaptability.
Regardless of these di↵erences, all three study areas identified similar categories of is-
sues they were seeking to address (dubbed “resiliency strategy areas” in Lee County, “goal
areas” or “action areas” in Broward County, and “climate change vulnerabilities” in the City
of Punta Gorda). Categories that appeared across all study areas included infrastructure,
public policies and programs, land use management, water supply, natural systems and re-
sources, and education/outreach (Beever et al., 2009, 2010; Broward County Climate Change
Task Force, 2010; Broward County, 2015b; SFRCCC, 2012).
To determine other similarities and di↵erences between study areas’ local perceptions
of resilience, the next section discusses results from a keyword analysis conducted for each
resilience ideal type.
2.4.2 Resilience Ideal Types
2.4.2.1 Engineering Resilience
Overall, keywords related to engineering resilience made up the greatest proportion of oc-
currences in both Lee County and Punta Gorda’s extracted segments, comprising forty-one
and fifty-three percent of overall keyword occurrences, respectively. In Broward County,
engineering resilience keywords were tied for most frequent with ecosystem resilience, com-
prising thirty-seven percent of all engineering keywords. When comparing the prominence of
each keyword across the three study areas, there were some key similarities and di↵erences
(Figure 2.2a).
In the extracted segments for Broward and Lee Counties, forms of the word regulate
(including searches for the terms policy and law) were by far most common, making up
fifty and forty-five percent of all engineering keywords, respectively. In Broward segments,
occurrences of the keyword regulate were rather varied, including discussions of regulations
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Figure 2.2: Comparison of keyword prevalence for each resilience ideal type. Frequencies
(f) in legends represent the total number of keyword occurrences for the given type. For
the sake of comparison between study areas, numbers on the x-axis represents individual
keyword count/overall frequency (f)*100.
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related to growth management, building codes, land development, and integration of cli-
mate resilience into planning documents. While some segments promoted collaborating to
develop a list of already existing regulations, others supported the creation of new policies or
amendments to guide climate change e↵orts. One segment specifically mentioned the need
to not enact any new policies that might inhibit the placement of cost-e↵ective housing that
meets the Florida building codes, though most segments were discussing ways to improve
regulations.
The command-and-control approach, often apparent in management strategies devel-
oped under the engineering resilience paradigm, was particularly apparent in part of one
segment that mentioned regulations:
“The recommendations presented [...] provide a foundation for establishing a
more predictable physical environment in the face of climate change through
regulations, adaptation strategies, and emergency operations, with the goal of
reducing future economic losses and threats to public safety” (SFRCCC, 2012,
p.39)
In Lee County, all but one occurrence of regulate/policy/law appeared in segments
from the CCRS, which is not surprising since policy and program-related strategies are
a key action area. Like Broward, Lee County was primarily focused on improving and
implementing existing regulations, rather than creating new ones. For example, the CCRS
recommended policy analyses for land use regulations, and discussed the need to identify
conflicting policies between programs as well as policies that could be implemented without
funding. It also highlighted existing policies that could better integrate climate change,
and proposed “climate policy integration where federal, state, and local governments work
collaboratively” (Beever et al., 2010, p.122). However, there were some recommendations to
adopt new policies or laws including ones that would limit public investment in infrastructure
with high future maintenance costs and direct that funding toward projects that could result
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in energy savings. Also, the CCRS recommended establishment of strong habitat protection
laws.
In extracted segments for the City of Punta Gorda, forms of regulate/policy/law were
third most common after the forms of the words restore and recover. Despite being one
of the most common keywords, there were only three occurrences. Two were stated policy
objectives to 1) continually update the City’s Adaptation Plan with identified strategies
that would promote coastal resilience, and 2) acquire funding for exotic species removal to
“increase coastal resiliency to the built environment” (City of Punta Gorda, 2016a). The
third instance was a goal in the City’s long range financial plan to expand the role of the
Charlotte Harbor National Estuary Program to provide policy advice to local, state, and
federal governments for the sake of climate resilience (City of Punta Gorda, 2016b).
Given the overall prevalence of keywords about regulation across the three study areas, it
is important to consider that while regulatory instruments can be powerful tools for creating
change, scholars like Gunderson and Holling (2002) caution that “static assumptions can
create the very surprise and crisis they wish to avoid” (p.12). Hence, regulations that
encourage flexibility and coordination should be emphasized.
Also across all three study areas, restoration was one of the top three most frequent key-
words, comprising twenty percent of Broward’s (f=29) engineering resilience terms, twenty-
eight percent of Punta Gorda’s (f=5), and thirteen percent of Lee County’s (f=14).
In Broward County, restoration was often linked to the Everglades, and coastal dunes
or shorelines. In the City of Punta Gorda, restoration was mentioned in two contexts. First,
it was included three times in a report when discussing an oyster restoration project The
Nature Conservancy was implementing to improve the health of Charlotte Harbor. Next,
restoration was mentioned in the City’s Comprehensive Plan in its objectives and policies
related to enhancing native species and removing exotics.
Like Broward County and Punta Gorda, Lee County most often referred to restoration
in the context of natural areas and native species. However, Lee County’s resilience strategy
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was unique in two ways. First, it specified that habitat restoration should only be conducted
in places where landward recession is possible, allowing room for sea-level rise. Second, it
mentioned restoration of historic buildings, addressing cultural impacts of climate change.
There were also many engineering resilience keywords that were rare, or completely
absent, in segments from all three study areas. Four engineering resilience keywords had zero
hits: top-down, equilibrium, constancy, and armor. Rebound was also rare, only appearing
once in a Broward document explaining how native landscapes fare better in disasters, and
rebound faster.
The keyword with the greatest variation in proportions across study areas was recovery.
While recovery was fairly common in Punta Gorda and Lee County’s documents, it made up
only four percent of Broward County’s engineering resilience keyword occurrences. The City
of Punta Gorda most often referred to recovery in the context of the 2004 Hurricane Season,
when they were heavily impacted by Hurricane Charley. Even so, Punta Gorda discussed
both short- and long-term recovery as priorities.
In Lee County, recovery was included in the definition for climate change resilience
(“the ability to survive, recover from, and/or live with the e↵ects of climate change” (Beever
et al., 2010, p.13)), and as one of three phases of resilience activities (along with planning
and response/execution). Hence, it is worth noting that while quick recovery is a stated goal
for Lee County, it is always discussed as part of a larger process.
2.4.2.2 Ecosystem/Ecological/Social Resilience
Overall, in Broward County, ecosystem resilience keywords were tied with engineering re-
silience keywords as most common. In Punta Gorda, ecosystem resilience was the second
most common category of keywords, whereas in Lee County, these keywords were least com-
mon.
There were two ecosystem resilience keywords that comprised more than ten percent of
keywords for all three study areas: conserve and maintain (function) (Figure 2.2b).
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In Broward County, the term conserve appeared in generic recommendations for water
and energy conservation, as well as in the context of conservation land acquisition. Specifi-
cally, multiple references are made to Florida’s Water and Land Conservation Amendment,
which Florida voters approved in 2014 by nearly seventy-five percent. Among other out-
comes, this amendment created a Land Acquisition Trust Fund to “acquire and improve
conservation easements, wildlife management areas, wetlands, forests, fish and wildlife habi-
tats, beaches and shores, recreational trails and parks, urban open space, rural landscapes,
working farms and ranches, historical and geological sites, lands protecting water and drink-
ing water resources and lands in the Everglades Agricultural Areas and the Everglades Pro-
tection Area” (FL Const. art. IX, §28). This Amendment has since become somewhat
controversial because funds that many expected to go directly toward conservation land
acquisition have instead been spent on agencies’ administrative costs.
Lee County’s use of the term conservation was similar to Broward County’s, focusing
largely on water, energy, and coastal land conservation, although Lee County indicates a
longer term vision, explaining that conservation strategies are one potential entry point for
mainstreaming climate resilience. Land conservation strategies included land acquisition,
conservation easements and the purchase or transfer of development rights, yet the County
notes the importance of prioritizing the implementation of conservation strategies in areas
with the ability to support coastal ecosystem migration (Beever et al., 2010). Lee County
also recommended promoting conservation through educating residents and business, and
proposed establishing a system to pay farmers for implementing practices that would enhance
carbon sequestration on croplands.
Punta Gorda emphasized conservation through public education. The City expressed
two main conservation goals in their resilience segments: the need to e↵ectively communicate
with the public about the environment and conservation strategies, and the desire to conserve
energy and water through green building alternatives, which should be promoted through
education and incentive programs.
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Segments discussing maintaining function were also prevalent in all three study ar-
eas. Broward County recommended maintaining seasonal water levels and implementing fire
management schemes to help the Everglades continue to function as a carbon sink. They
also proposed a number of ways to maintain resilience, including natural area diversity and
connectivity, as well as protecting beaches and dunes between developed areas and the shore-
line to function as natural bu↵ers. Other functions of vegetated dunes Broward sought to
maintain were trapping windblown sand, absorbing wave energy, and minimizing erosion.
One function Lee County sought to maintain was sediment transport, and rolling ease-
ments were suggested as a strategy for doing so as sea level rise causes inland ecosystem
migration. Furthermore, Lee County set a resilience strategy to maintain the function of
local food systems for the sake of both human and environmental health. Similarly, the City
of Punta Gorda cited the maintenance of agriculture as a benefit of increasing resilience.
One of the most fascinating excerpts about maintaining function came from Punta
Gorda’s Adaptation Plan, where questions about maintaining function as a constraint for
improving natural resource management are raised. Specifically, the plan questioned how
short term management goals should be balanced with longer term habitat resilience, asking
“what ecosystem should be maintained, the current or the future?” (Beever et al., 2009,
p.257).
While conserve and maintain were common keywords across the three study areas, other
keywords were very rare across the sites, such as instability, persistent, regenerate, renew,
and reorganize.
The prevalence and use of the keyword, sustainability, varied greatly across the three
study areas. Sustainability was a term used frequently in Broward County, comprising forty-
two percent of its ecosystem resilience keywords.
In some cases, Broward documents lumped sustainability and resilience together in
general statements about goals or objectives:
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“...dedicated to a more sustainable and resilient Southeast Florida” (SFRCCC,
2012, p.13).
“...building resilience and sustainability as cornerstones of Southeast Florida’s
regional economic, social and ecological system” (SFRCCC, 2012, p.48)
“...presenting goals and policies to address sustainability, resiliency and quality
of life.” (Broward County, 2012, p.8)
The di↵erentiation between the use of resilience and sustainability in other segments
appeared to be that resilience was applied primarily to climate change; whereas, sustainabil-
ity was used to refer to other environmental issues, most often those related to wetlands or
water resources. For instance, multiple excerpts specifically talk about building or achieving
“a sustainable, climate resilient community.”
Lee County used the term sustainability less frequently, yet more specifically, in its
segments. Segments discussed the need for sustainable food systems, the need for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions while maintaining economic sustainability, and the need to develop
adequate strategies for monitoring and evaluation to promote long-term sustainability. In
Lee County’s documents, sustainability planning is considered one part of a larger resilience
strategy, whereas Broward cites climate resilience as a single component of sustainability.
Punta Gorda’s segments use the term sustainability only in the context of creating a
more pedestrian-friendly city.
2.4.2.3 Social-ecological Resilience
Social-ecological resilience keywords made up the smallest proportion of total terms in both
Broward County and Punta Gorda, comprising twenty-six and twelve percent of overall
keyword occurrences for each study area, respectively. In Lee County, social-ecological re-
silience keywords made up the second-smallest proportion of total keyword occurrences, with
thirty-one percent. Because Punta Gorda segments only had four social-ecological keyword
occurrences, the proportion of each keyword appears falsely enhanced (Figure 2.2c).
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For social-ecological resilience keywords, there were no terms which occurred frequently
across all three study areas. However, forms of the word opportunity made up over ten
percent of keyword occurrences for each study area, suggesting this may be a promising
frame for approaching climate change resilience strategies proposing more transformational
adaptation options.
One Broward segment proposed opportunities could be enhanced by using a “no regrets”
approach to sustainable development and community resilience:
“By promoting a no regrets approach, it is possible to a↵ect positive outcomes
that further regional climate change mitigation and adaptation goals while im-
proving community livability, economic opportunities and resource sustainabil-
ity. These adaptation strategies address: building design, elevation and hard-
ening; transportation networks; other critical public infrastructure (potable wa-
ter, wastewater, stormwater and energy/power); and green infrastructure” (SFR-
CCC, 2012, p. B-1).
Though not explained within the segment, a “no regrets” approach typically refers
to adopting climate change strategies that would make sense for sustainable development
whether or not specific climate risks are realized in the future (Siegel and Jorgensen, 2011).
These approaches emphasize improving both knowledge and capacity (Siegel and Jorgensen,
2011). Yet, nearly every adaptation strategy listed above appears to address the built envi-
ronment rather than social dimensions of resilience.
In Broward County, the term that made up the greatest proportion of social-ecological
resilience keywords was coordination, which was used similarly to collaboration. Both key-
words were applied to a wide range of topics in Broward’s segments. In thirteen segments,
municipal, county and regional coordination were emphasized, as in the following goals:
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“Achieve a sustainable, climate resilient community by [...] continuing to coordi-
nate and communicate locally and regionally to monitor and address the changing
needs and conditions of the community” (Broward County, 2015a, p.19-1)
“Broward County shall, in coordination with its municipalities, pursue policies
and programs to maintain the resilience and adaptive capacity of coastal resources
by providing bu↵ers between developed areas and the shoreline, thereby reducing
the impacts of climate change on both ecosystems and communities” (Broward
County, 2015a, p.19-5)
Larger scale coordination was also mentioned four times in Broward County segments,
with discussion of the need to work across state, regional, and federal levels. Only one
occurrence of the term “collaborate” emphasized cross-sector collaboration among public,
private and nonprofit entities. Other coordination needs were linked to transportation,
policies, water resources, and fire management.
Collaboration was also the most frequent keyword in Punta Gorda’s segments, despite
appearing only twice. In both cases, it referred to TEAM Punta Gorda, a non-profit launched
by concerned citizens to assist with Hurricane Charley recovery in 2004. The non-profit’s
mission has since shifted to promoting healthy growth and development, in general (TEAM
Punta Gorda, 2016).
In Lee County, the keyword comprising the greatest proportion of social-ecological
terms was change, which excluded any use of the phrase climate change. In one case, Lee
County proposed encouraging behavior changes that would reduce vehicle miles traveled.
The County also proposed changing building codes and design to become more e cient;
changing to energy e cient buses and taxis; making necessary changes in resilience strate-
gies based on regular monitoring and evaluation; and engaging vulnerable populations to
strengthen community mental health to prepare for changes that might come after a disaster
(Beever et al., 2010). These proposed strategies indicate a willingness to remain flexible in
the face of uncertainty.
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2.4.3 Dimensions of Resilience
As mentioned in the methods section of this chapter, each dimension of resilience (built
environment, population and governance, economic development and social dimensions) had
a di↵erent number of keywords, which would skew results if left unchecked. Therefore, data
were normalized to provide a more valid perspective. To normalize, a mean was calculated
to determine the average number of times any single keyword appeared in a segment about
resilience. For example, in Broward County the built environment dimension had seventeen
keywords that appeared a total of two-hundred eighty-five times, therefore each keyword for
this dimension occurred an average of 16.76 times per segment.
Broward and Lee Counties showed very similar patterns of keyword prevalence per
segment. From most to least frequent, the most prevalent dimensions were built environment,
population and governance, economic development, and then social dimensions. In Punta
Gorda’s segments, there were not enough data to identify clear trends (Figure 2.3), therefore
this section focuses primarily on Broward and Lee Counties.
Within the dimension of the built environment, water and energy were key concerns in
both cases, followed by transportation and housing. In fact, although there were seventeen
keywords representing the dimension of the built environment, these clearly dominated the
discussion.
Likewise, the dimension of population and governance in Broward and Lee Counties was
dominated by discussions of budgets or funding. In Broward segments, many of these occur-
rences were in the context of supporting or prioritizing funding for infrastructure projects
related to finding alternative water supplies or energy sources. In Lee County, discussions
about funding also prioritized funding for the built environment, but included additional
goals to fund long-term research, education and outreach programs, and identify policies
that could be implemented without funding.
For the economic dimension of resilience, most keywords found in Broward and Lee
County segments were actually some form of the word economy. In Broward, many of these
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Figure 2.3: Prevalence of each resilience dimension across study areas, expressed as average
number of keyword occurrences per segment.
occurrences were related to strengthening local economies through green jobs, economic
growth, and “green collar” training programs. Additionally, these terms appear in many
statements about enhancing sustainability by mitigating potential economic, environmental
and social impacts of climate change, acknowledging the “triple bottom line” of sustainability.
Similarly, Lee County emphasized the connectedness of local economies with local natural
resources.
Finally, for the social dimensions of resilience, three indicator keywords dominated the
segments in all three study areas: vulnerability, education and food.
2.5 Conclusions
The goal of this research was to analyze definitions of resilience used in o cial documents
from three study areas in order to understand how the term was being conceptualized at a
local level. Across the three study areas, only Lee County’s Resiliency Strategy provided any
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explicit definition of resilience, despite Broward County using the term one hundred forty-
two times more often. However, a number of themes related to di↵erent types of resilience
were apparent based on the context clues and keywords that appeared in segments that
contained the word resilient.
This research revealed that there is some inconsistency, and even confusion, about how
the term resilience is used at a local level – even in communities which are heralded for
their resilience-building e↵orts. While some communities carefully reflect on the meaning of
resilience, working to balance short- and long-term goals across dimensions, others seem to
use the term to refer to climate change, in general. However, some common themes resonate
across all three resilient communities, including priority action areas, like infrastructure, pub-
lic policy, natural resources, and education/outreach. Also, while the exact configurations of
resilience dimensions and types varied across study areas, it is notable that all three places
include a combination of resilience approaches, and appear to focus on multiple dimensions.
With the more nuanced understanding of resilience this research provides, planners may
be able to reflect more deeply on specific resilience needs for a given locality. Therefore, they
would be better able to identify the most appropriate resilience approach, or combination
of approaches, to balance short and long term objectives for social, economic, political and
physical components of the social-ecological system.
Previous research has called for the adoption of a common conceptual framework for
resilience to improve its application, operationalization and measurement (Brand and Jax,
2007; Davidson et al., 2016; Burton, 2015). Others have recommended shifting away from
the engineering resilience paradigm toward a more holistic, social-ecological approach (Gun-
derson et al., 2010; Garmestani and Benson, 2013). While there is value in these recom-
mendations, this research does not intend to determine an ideal configuration of di↵erent
resilience interpretations; instead a more fundamental preceding step is recommended.
Resilience, or any other term used as a central tenet for planning, should be explicitly
defined in planning and policy documents. Furthermore, planners and planning documents
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should be able to explain how they are working towards resilience via specific actions. Lee
County’s Resiliency Strategy (Beever et al., 2010) is recommended as a prime example of
this. When thinking globally and acting locally to enhance resilience across scales, it is
important for communities to be explicit about what resilience means in the context of their
local system to understand how they are contributing to a larger-scale, supposedly common
vision. While this work indicates the need to critically engage with the concept of resilience at
a local level, further research is necessary to understand the e↵ectiveness of specific resilience
actions in achieving broader objectives like building flexibility or adaptiveness into a system.
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Chapter 3
Reflecting on Resilience in Broward County, Florida:
A Newspaper Content Analysis of Hurricane Wilma Recovery
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, the concept of resilience has gained much attention in the field of disaster
management, largely replacing vulnerability as the central tenet of academic and policy liter-
ature (Doorn, 2015). Though resilience is a burgeoning theme in the field of disaster research,
its meaning can be elusive when paradoxical definitions place value on both withstanding
disturbance and building capacity for transformation. For example, the International Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) defines resilience as “the capacity of social, economic, and en-
vironmental systems to cope with a hazardous event or trend or disturbance, responding
or reorganizing in ways that maintain their essential function, identity, and structure, while
also maintaining the capacity for adaptation, learning, and transformation” (IPCC, 2014b),
placing value on both resistance to and capacity for change. Nelson (2011) and Gunderson
et al. (2010) address this paradox by distinguishing between specified and general resilience.
Specified resilience answers the question “resilience of what to what?” and addresses how
a particular system can become more resistant to a known disturbance (Gunderson et al.,
2010; Carpenter et al., 2001). General resilience, on the other hand, refers to the system as a
whole and its capacity to deal with novel, less predictable shocks, like the impacts of climate
change and sea level rise (Gunderson et al., 2010; Carpenter et al., 2012). Adaptations that
enhance specified resilience may undermine general resilience, thus it is essential for disaster
*To cite this chapter: Torres, H., Alsharif, K. (2016). Reflecting on Resilience in Broward County,
Florida: A Newspaper Content Analysis of Hurricane Wilma Recovery. International Journal of Disaster
Risk Reduction. DOI: 10.1016/j.ijdrr.2016.08.007
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managers and other decision makers to remain cognizant of the interplay between the two
concepts in order to balance goals appropriately.
This chapter uses a computer software assisted review and content analysis of local news-
paper articles (available in print and on-line) written after Hurricane Wilma struck Broward
County, in order to identify surrogates for resilience in Broward, and to examine whether
and how attempts to address specified resilience issues after the storm either influenced, or
exposed opportunities to improve, the general resilience of Broward County. Research about
mass media agenda-setting has shown that the media is influenced by key external sources,
such as “politicians, public o cials, public relations practitioners, and any individual, like
the President of the United States, who influences media content” (McCombs and Reynolds,
1994). Furthermore, the media has been shown to have a powerful influence on setting civic
agendas, though the causal factors correlating media messages to individuals’ attitudes and
beliefs has been long debated (Williams, 2003). This research assumes that Sun-Sentinel
newspaper articles, to some degree, reflect the agendas of key stakeholders and have the po-
tential to shape local civic agendas in Broward County, making them one important element
of understanding local resilience in the context of disaster response and recovery.
According to Carpenter et al. (2005), one of the main challenges of estimating the re-
silience of social-ecological systems is that direct observation requires measuring the thresh-
olds or “tipping points” that separate di↵erent stable states in a particular system. Yet,
these thresholds can only be measured when they are crossed, which happens incredibly
rarely. Therefore, indirect or partial observations of resilience through the use of “surro-
gates” are often necessary (Carpenter et al., 2005). The word “surrogate” is used instead
of “indicator” to acknowledge that many aspects of resilience are not directly observable,
and may change over time (Carpenter et al., 2005). Two recommended mechanisms for
developing surrogates to estimate resilience include stakeholder assessments and historical
profiling (Carpenter et al., 2005). In this study, the stakeholder views represented in local
newspaper articles about a particular historical event are combined with theoretical work
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about resilience to identify surrogates that can be used to estimate resilience in Broward
County and recommend pathways for improving resilience.
While previous research has worked toward refining the concept of resilience (Folke, 2006;
Garmestani and Benson, 2013; Nelson et al., 2007) and assessing the resilience of systems
(Carpenter et al., 2005; Gunderson et al., 2010; Carpenter et al., 2001), this research is unique
in its investigation of how the resilience of a system can work across scales and disturbance
types. The next section provides a background of the study area and Hurricane Wilma,
and then describes the methodological framework and coding scheme used in this analysis.
Section 3 summarizes the results of the newspaper article review. Section 4 provides a
discussion of the findings. The final section provides conclusions with recommendations for
areas of emphasis to build general resilience in Broward County.
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Study Area
Broward County is located on the southeast coast of Florida with about 24 miles of coastline
on the Atlantic Ocean (Figure 3.1). Broward has a population of more than 1.8 million
people, and is comprised of 31 independent municipalities, 8 of which are densely popu-
lated coastal cities. Because of its humid subtropical climate and low-lying, porous geology,
Broward is exposed to a number of natural hazards including hurricanes, flooding and coastal
erosion – all of which are expected to intensify with climate change and sea level rise (AAAS,
2013; Walsh et al., 2014).
Hurricane Wilma swept through Broward County on October 24, 2005 as the most
severe storm to strike Florida in over a half-century. Currently, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), names Wilma as the fifth costliest hurricane in United
States history after Andrew (1992), Katrina (2005), Ike (2008) and Sandy (2012) (Blake
et al., 2011; Leins, 2014). As a result of the storm, over 11,000 Florida Power and Light
(FPL) poles fell or snapped, and 241 substations experienced extreme damage (Salisbury,
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Figure 3.1: Broward County, Florida
2010). Power outages a↵ected 98 percent of Broward County, closing schools for two weeks
and leaving many households in the dark for even longer (PBS&J, 2005; Lukic, 2009). Over
2,000 households were displaced from their homes, entirely (Welsh and Esnard, 2009).
3.2.2 News Article Selection
To narrow the scope of this research, three broad categories of post-storm specified resilience
issues were identified through archival research and discussions with Broward homeowners
during focus groups that were conducted for related research. These categories of post-storm
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issues were then corroborated during an informational interview with Broward’s Director
of Environmental Protection and Growth Management Department within the Division of
Emergency Management. These issues were: 1) FPL e↵orts to restore electricity and prepare
for future storms; 2) Availability of generators to provide electricity while the electric grid
was down; and 3) Recovery of vulnerable populations.
Using the Access World News database, relevant articles for each category were compiled
from the primary daily newspaper in Broward County, the Sun-Sentinel. While the Sun-
Sentinel also covers stories in Miami-Dade and Palm Beach Counties, Broward is its primary
audience. A search was conducted for each of the 3 categories of post storm issues, including
all articles written between October 24, 2005 – the day Wilma struck – and December 3,
2015, containing Hurricane AND Wilma in the lead paragraph. For FPL e↵orts, search
criteria also included articles with FPL OR “Florida Power & Light” OR “Florida Power
and Light” OR “FP&L” in the lead paragraph (n=65). For generator issues, search criteria
also included any form of the word “generator” in the lead paragraph (n=51). For vulnerable
populations, search criteria also included any form of the words “vulnerable” OR “special
need” OR “poor” OR “poverty” OR “elder” OR “child” OR “homeless” OR “minority”
in the lead paragraph (n=56). The third category utilized more search terms to yield an
adequate number of results. Duplicates and irrelevant pieces were removed from search
results (e.g. obituaries), whereas editorials and opinion pieces were included along with
news articles, features, columns. In all, 172 articles from the Sun-Sentinel were collected,
and then imported into MAXQDA to organize and categorize articles, and also to help
quantify the prominence of themes that were present.
3.2.3 Coding Scheme and Data Analysis
Once articles were imported into MAXQDA, an initial coding scheme was developed based on
a thorough investigation of academic literature about social-ecological resilience and sustain-
able adaptation. Ten overarching themes emerged in the academic literature as conditions
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that could either enhance or inhibit resilience: benefit-risk distribution, citizen expectations,
diversity, ecological and social reserves, modularity and openness, participatory governance
and deliberation, path dependencies, tightness of feedbacks, and vulnerability issues (Car-
penter et al., 2012; Gunderson et al., 2010; Plummer, 2009; Lebel et al., 2006; Brown, 2011;
Elmqvist et al., 2003; Walker and Salt, 2012; Levi, 1997; Penning-Rowsell and Pardoe, 2012).
After further research and investigation, fifteen additional “subthemes” were included
and categorized under overarching themes for the sake of organization. However, each sub-
theme was uniquely defined and could stand on its own for analysis. For example, “ac-
countability” was a subtheme of “benefit-risk distribution” since both relate to issues of who
experiences the costs and benefits of storm recovery. However, segments coded with the
theme of accountability were primarily normative statements about who “should” be held
responsible for damages that occurred as a result of Hurricane Wilma, whereas segments
coded with the theme of benefit-risk distribution discussed the pros and cons of certain
recovery actions as well as who actually paid for recovery-related costs. Most (eight) of
the subthemes included were categorized under “social reserves” since this broad theme en-
compasses both knowledge and skills that might contribute to post-disaster recovery and
redevelopment (Carpenter et al., 2012). These included communication, cross-scale gover-
nance, decentralization, leadership, learning and memory, participatory governance, social
networks and trust.
The 172 newspaper articles were read and hand-coded by a single coder in multiple
waves over the course of two weeks based on the unique definitions and parameters that
had been developed for each theme/subtheme. Once this was done, the frequency of each
code’s occurrence was counted for each set of articles. Across all three article sets, six
of the themes/subthemes clearly emerged as most prominent: benefit-risk distribution, ac-
countability, learning and memory, cross-scale governance, vulnerability issues, and social
networks. Because a comprehensive list defining and justifying all twenty-five codes within
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this chapter would be cumbersome, the six most prominent codes are defined and clarified
below:
• Benefit-Risk Distribution: Barnett and O’Neill (2010) argue that when responses
or adaptations to disturbances disproportionately burden the most at-risk populations,
overall vulnerability may increase rather than decrease, thereby decreasing resilience.
This concern is echoed by Penning-Rowsell and Pardoe (2012), who studied trade-o↵s
in flood risk-reduction strategies, concluding that groups who lose money or protection
as a result of risk-reduction decisions must be given careful attention. To analyze
how risks and benefits were distributed following Hurricane Wilma, newspaper article
segments were coded with this theme if they mentioned the pros and cons of particular
risk-reduction strategies, or if they mentioned economic costs or government assistance
related to storm damage.
• Accountability: In their work about managing resilience in social-ecological systems,
Lebel et al. (2006) found support for the proposition that “accountable authorities that
also pursue just distributions of benefits and involuntary risks enhance the adaptive ca-
pacity of vulnerable groups and society as a whole” (p.1). When authorities or powerful
entities are held accountable via transparency requirements, independent monitoring,
separation of powers, legal recourse, or budget control (among other things), then the
capacity to manage for resilience may increase (Lebel et al., 2006). While this “sub-
theme” was categorized under benefit-risk distribution, newspaper articles coded with
this theme included normative statements about which entities should be blamed for
damages and who should be responsible for the costs associated with recovery. Seg-
ments coded with this theme often expressed a sense of injustice for a group being
made to pay for something they did not believe they should be held accountable for.
• Learning and Memory: Reserves of knowledge can promote recovery and resilience
after a disturbance occurs, and progressing research about social-ecological resilience
46
has found that social learning and memory can play a key role in the management of
resilience in a system (Folke, 2006; Carpenter et al., 2012). While social memory can
be di cult to quantify, Berkes and Seixas 2005, propose qualitatively exploring ways
communities have learned from past crises. Segments of newspaper articles were coded
with this theme when they compared Wilma experiences to past storms (implying
that social memory informed decisions made during Wilma preparation or recovery),
when they listed lessons learned from Wilma experiences, or when they noted behavior
changes that were attributed to experiences with Wilma or past storms.
• Cross-Scale and Multilevel Governance: Garmestani and Benson’s (2013) frame-
work for resilience-based management of social-ecological systems strongly emphasized
the importance of knowledge and information flow between organizations operating
at di↵erent scales of governance (i.e. municipal, county, state, federal). While local
management strategies have the benefit of emerging quickly, formal rules at larger
scales are necessary for e↵ective long-term implementation, hence resilience-based gov-
ernance requires cross-scale linkages (Garmestani and Benson, 2013). The need for
cross-scale communications and interaction is also supported by resilience researchers
such as Berkes and Seixas (2005), Lebel et al. (2006), and Folke (2006). This code was
used to denote segments of articles that discussed interactions across multiple scales
of governance (like between the county and state) or interactions between di↵erent
sectors (like county and FPL).
• Vulnerability Issues: In this analysis, vulnerability issues were closely linked with
benefit-risk distribution. As previously mentioned, risk-reduction strategies or adap-
tations that disproportionately burden vulnerable populations can reduce a system’s
resilience (Barnett and ONeill, 2010; Brown, 2011). Cutter et al. (2008) consider vul-
nerability and resilience to be overlapping terms, defining vulnerability as the existing
characteristics of social systems that make them susceptible to harm, and resilience
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as the capacity to respond or recover (Doorn, 2015). Hence, this theme was used to
code article segments identifying specific, pre-existing vulnerable populations (e.g. sin-
gle mothers, the elderly) or segments identifying pre-existing vulnerability issues (e.g.
lack of a↵ordable housing).
• Social Networks: According to Lebel et al. (2006), “A society’s ability to manage
resilience resides in actors, social networks, and institutions” (p.6). Social networks
can act as a safety net to provide more dynamic and flexible alternatives to govern-
ment assistance (Lebel et al., 2006; Carpenter et al., 2012). Social networks are also
important conduits for the transfer of knowledge that can spark innovative solutions
to problems (Moore and Westley, 2011). This code was used to denote segments of
newspaper articles referring to the presence or absence of social networks. For instance,
a segment coded with this theme might mention a church or mosque making e↵orts to
help the community after Wilma, or it might mention a person’s reliance on family or
friends during recovery.
Once these six prominent themes were identified, the segments in each article set that
were coded with these themes were qualitatively analyzed in greater detail to uncover how
each one impacted or uncovered lessons about Broward’s resilience. Summaries of how each
of the above themes were represented within their respective article sets are presented in the
following section.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Florida Power & Light
Florida Power and Light (FPL) – a subsidiary of NextEra Energy and the largest rate-
regulated utility in Florida – has invested over $2 billion in adaptations since Hurricane
Wilma knocked out power to more customers than any storm before or since (Mayk and
Zollo, 2005; FPL, 2015).
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3.3.1.1 Accountability
Accountability, closely related to benefit-risk distribution, was the most commonly occurring
theme among newspaper articles about FPL. The theme appeared 71 times and in 55 percent
of the articles. Because FPL is a regulated monopoly, ratepayers pay costs for grid repairs,
so after Wilma, Florida’s Public Service Commission (PSC) was responsible for inspecting
whether FPL had done its part to manage the grid adequately. With approval from the
PSC, FPL recovered $2.086 billion in storm-related costs from customers through a storm
surcharge, including lost revenue due to homes and businesses that were not able to use
electricity.
When considering the widespread pole failures that occurred during Hurricane Wilma,
potentially accountable actors named in news articles included: 1) Wilma’s powerful winds;
2) BellSouth, a telecom company owning 40 percent of the wooden polls felled by Wilma;
and 3) FPL, for not adequately inspecting and maintaining poles.
In three of the articles, FPL claimed it was the massive strength of Wilma’s winds that
was to blame for the widespread grid failures – not the condition of its poles – pointing to the
fact that new and concrete poles fared as well as rotten, wooden ones. On the other hand,
at least two other articles argue that extent and length of outages was disproportionate to
the intensity of Wilma, which was a category 2 storm when it arrived in Broward.
In four more articles, FPL pointed out that in a post-storm assessment, 40 percent of
the poles downed by Wilma were owned by BellSouth who rented pole usage to FPL. Hence,
according to a joint-use agreement, BellSouth would be responsible for pole replacement on
any shared, defective poles.
Despite these attempts to shift focus away from FPL, twenty-six of the thirty-six articles
related to the theme of accountability implied or explicitly stated that FPL should be held
accountable for the widespread outages that occurred when Wilma struck. Nine of those
articles mentioned a report from the PSC written before Wilma struck in 2005 warning
FPL that inadequate pole inspection policies would allow weak and rotted poles to remain
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in service. One article included 5 instances of customers whose complaints to FPL about
rotting poles were ignored, and another mentioned that in a town hall meeting, Broward
County residents singled out FPL as a “recovery villain” (Nevins, 2005a).
Yet, two articles expressed hesitation among city lobbyists to hold FPL accountable
because, as one interviewee said, “FPL was too strong to assail in Tallahassee and there
is no alternative to finding some compromise with the power company” (Nevins, 2005b)
Another raises questions about whether the PSC is doing an adequate job holding FPL
accountable since it changed from an elected to an appointed body through what the author
calls, “a deal cut in the dark backrooms of Tallahassee” (Nevins, 2005b) in 1978.
3.3.1.2 Benefit-Risk Distribution
Benefit-risk distribution was the second most commonly occurring resilience theme in news-
paper articles about FPL, appearing 54 times and in 42 percent of the articles. Two topics
which stood out regarding the distribution of benefits and risks after Hurricane Wilma were:
1) whether the benefits of burying power lines would outweigh the costs; and 2) controversy
about the practice of FPL customers – rather than shareholders or executives – actually
paying costs of hurricane recovery.
Most articles that mentioned burying power lines had an unassertive tone, but perceived
underground lines as a benefit. While some generally mentioned citizens’ discontent with
FPL for its hesitation to bury lines, others stated that if more lines were underground,
Wilma would not have knocked out power to 98 percent of Broward’s residents. Yet, two
articles mention that the financial burden may exceed the benefits, considering the fact that
about half of Broward County’s lines were already underground when Wilma hit. It may be
unrealistic to expect more buried lines to prevent power outages during storms, especially
if other electrical infrastructure feeding power to the lines were still above ground. Even if
buried lines did reduce wind damage from storms, water intrusion from sea level rise, storm
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surge, or a combination of the two could have “hellish consequences, particularly in coastal
areas,” according to an editorial written by a former FPL engineer (Sarkis, 2005).
Overall, articles about who should pay the costs of hurricane recovery had a more emo-
tional and distrustful tone, as evinced in multiple articles expressing dissatisfaction about
customers having to pay for what some perceived as FPL’s “failures and neglect” (Mayo,
2005) in maintaining their infrastructure. Because of Hurricane Wilma damage and related
power outages, FPL’s fourth quarter revenues from 2005 were reduced by about $40 million,
but overall profits for the year broke record highs. This was largely attributed to the com-
pany’s ability to “shift business risk on the customers” by recouping storm losses through
a hurricane surcharge and charging a base rate that includes a guaranteed 12 percent profit
(Heroux, 2006). Without post-storm risks to the company, some argue there is little incentive
for FPL to better prepare for future disasters.
At a PSC hearing to determine whether FPL was double-billing customers for storm
recovery through both base rates and the storm surcharge, some business people showed up
to express their discontent that FPL could charge customers for storm-related losses, but
their businesses could not. Without electricity for sometimes weeks, many businesses took
a financial hit after the storm, but could not charge customers for services they were unable
to provide, which is what FPL was doing, in their eyes.
Editorial writers also complained that while the PSC allowed FPL to recover its hur-
ricane losses from customers, then-governor Jeb Bush and other state legislators allowed
private insurance companies to “dictate where and to whom they would issue policies,” yet
they complained they were “tired of bailing out Citizens Property Insurance,” the state-run
insurer of last resort for Floridians who could not get approved for private property insur-
ance (Pignataro, 2005). Articles about benefit-risk distribution tended strongly toward the
opinion that state policies showed favoritism to large corporations rather than the average
Florida citizen.
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3.3.1.3 Learning & Memory
The theme of learning and memory, a categorized under social reserves, was the third most
common theme among newspaper articles about FPL, appearing 34 times and in 35 percent of
the articles. These articles expressed a variety of opinions about whether FPL had previously
experienced such widespread power failures, and how they might have learned from such
experiences. While former FPL president Armando Olivera said Wilma “knocked out power
to more FPL clients than ‘any single event’ in history” (Mann and Hemlock, 2005), others
claimed that “the power loss caused by Wilma wasn’t exactly unprecedented” (anonymous
editorial, 2005b), since damage was very similar to Hurricane Andrew in 1992, and Hurricane
Katrina left 70 percent of FPL customers without power just weeks before Wilma struck.
After Wilma, FPL made e↵orts to learn how it could do things di↵erently by hiring
a Dutch engineering consulting firm, KEMA, to conduct a post-storm analysis. KEMA
found that damaged transmission lines and transmission line structures were a major cause
of power outages, though FPL’s lines did meet design codes at the time of installation.
Also, although 11,000, or 1.5 percent of power distribution poles fell during Wilma, this was
actually an improvement from Hurricane Andrew, which felled 10 percent of poles. Since
Wilma, FPL has modified its pole inspection policies, installed smart-grid technology, scaled
up tree-trimming practices, and adjusted storm-hardening plans based on new information.
The extent to which local knowledge was integrated into FPL’s lessons learned is uncertain,
yet articles in which the theme of accountability occurred suggested that customers did not
feel their voices were being heard.
3.3.2 Generator-Readiness
Because of the widespread power loss in Broward following Hurricane Wilma, a lot of post-
storm activity revolved around the need for generators in order to resume day-to-day ac-
tivities for businesses, condominiums, and single-family households. This second group of
newspaper articles focuses on issues related to generator access and availability.
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3.3.2.1 Learning & Memory
Learning and memory was the most commonly occurring theme in news articles about gener-
ators following Hurricane Wilma. The theme appeared 61 times in 61 percent of the articles
in the set. As one might expect, many of these articles revolved around learning from Hur-
ricane Wilma the value of having a generator to deal with long-term power outages after
a storm. These articles also highlighted the value of social memory by presenting stories
about residents who were well-prepared for the storm because of lessons learned from pre-
vious storms like Hurricane Andrew in 1992, and the more recent Charley, Frances, Ivan
and Jeanne in 2004, as well as Katrina and Rita in 2005. These articles also discussed the
larger-scale issue of integrating lessons learned into Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) disaster relief programs.
Surely due to the sample of articles selected for analysis, the most prevalent lesson
learned from past storms was to have a generator. In fourteen articles, a variety of stakehold-
ers including homeowners, city, county, and state governments, vacation resorts, computer
agencies, grocery stores, gas stations, residential developments and neighborhoods acquired
one or more generators after Wilma in order to become better prepared for future storms.
The prevailing notion was that since power outages were the dominant problem during Hur-
ricane Wilma, generators would help people better prepare for future storms. Other articles
take a precautionary perspective, however, noting that in future disasters, structural dam-
age may render generators useless. Suggestions from these articles included reintroducing a
limited number of manual gas pumps in case of a power outage and integrating alternative
energy sources, like solar panels, so that generators are not so heavily relied upon after a
storm.
Other topics in this sample of articles ranged from institutional-level lessons learned –
like the need for improving communications infrastructure, keeping people better informed,
physical strengthening of infrastructure, and planning and arranging volunteer brigades and
tentative food drives – to individual-level lessons learned – like having cash on hand, stocking
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up on supplies, dealing with contractors, and planning ahead. Backing up data and files and
arranging for backup computer and telecommunication systems were other lessons learned by
business-owners. Building codes and neighborhood codes were also modified based on lessons
learned from experiences with Hurricane Wilma. For instance, roofs now need to resist higher
wind speeds and city o cials in Boynton Beach are enforcing new codes restricting piling up
bulk trash before scheduled pickups and parking commercial vehicles in residential areas.
On the other hand, one Op-Ed writer who prepared extensively for the storm expressed
that Wilma taught him to be less prepared:
“...if we had not been prepared like one of our neighbors with four kids, we
could have waited in line for free ice, free water, a free generator, free roof tarps
from FEMA and a $50,000 check within three weeks from FEMA for emergency
repairs to the home. No, because we were insured, we had to wait three months
for a settlement of our claim and pay our own deductibles. Because we had a
generator, we could not get a free one. Needless to say, we have learned our
lesson” (Lopez, 2009).
3.3.2.2 Benefit-Risk Distribution
As with the FPL article set, benefit-risk distribution was the second most commonly occur-
ring theme in newspaper articles about generators, appearing 47 times and in 47 percent of
these articles. Most of these 24 articles covered benefits and risks of requiring gas stations to
have backup generators. Other common topics included a generator reimbursement program
by FEMA, and the integration of solar power into homes, businesses, and tra c signals.
According to the newspaper articles, requiring generators at gas stations would benefit
station owners, since they would be able to continue selling fuel to customers during power
outages, and it would also benefit the state since it would help maintain public order. After
Wilma, people lined up for hours at gas stations with plentiful fuel supply, but no electricity.
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Then-governor Jeb Bush, however, vetoed money that would go toward helping gas sta-
tions install generators commenting, “the state should not be in the business of subsidizing
petroleum companies” (Kleindienst, 2005).
Gas station owners, however, claimed it was cost-prohibitive to spend $60,000-$70,000
on installing a generator when most gas stations would likely have less than a day’s worth
of fuel to sell. One editorial, in particular, claimed station owners had no incentive to install
generators since price gouging laws in Florida prevented them from recuperating costs by
raising prices when demand surged in a crisis. He contended, “Price controls make us pay
with our time, rather than our money. I know which one I’d rather spend” (Maybohm,
2005).
While it was not definitive whether benefits and risks associated with requiring gen-
erators at gas stations were justly distributed, FEMA’s generator reimbursement program
following Wilma was overwhelmingly believed to benefit middle- and upper- income Florid-
ians, leaving many vulnerable and low-income residents powerless. In Broward County, the
generator reimbursements totaled $41 million in the first 7 weeks after Wilma, exceeding the
amount FEMA spent on home repairs. Although the program “reimburse[d] anyone, regard-
less of income, for generators, chain saws, wet/dry vacuums, air purifiers and dehumidifiers,”
lower-income residents were less likely to be able to pay the cost of a generator up-front, and
then wait for a reimbursement (Kestin and Maines, 2005).
Two of the twenty-four generator articles mentioning benefit-risk distribution discussed
the potential benefits of having solar panels during a power outage. After Wilma, solar tra c
signals in Coral Springs made roads safer, and saved expenses related to placing o cers at
those intersections to direct tra c. For one Hollywood resident, the post-storm advantages –
particularly hot showers – were a surprise bonus to the economic and environmental benefits
he had anticipated. Despite the benefits, however, solar panels are very costly. The solar
tra c signals cost $10,000 each, and one woman’s award-winning solar home in Key Largo
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cost $24,000 to set up. Apart from being expensive, solar power needs sunlight to work, and
there is still a risk of solar panels being damaged in a storm.
3.3.2.3 Cross-Scale & Multilevel Governance
Cross-scale and multilevel governance was the third most commonly occurring theme within
the generator articles, appearing 38 times and in 39 percent of these articles. This set of
articles discussed a variety of issues related to coordinating governance from local to national
levels or facilitating coordination between stakeholders from di↵erent sectors.
One prominent topic in these twenty articles was legislation requiring gas stations and
other institutions like nursing homes, condominiums and grocery stores to install backup
generators in case of extended power outages after a storm. Regarding generators at gas
stations, some discussion revolved around whether such policies would be more appropriately
mandated at the city, county or state level, and whether a tax rebate or loan program should
be implemented to help gas stations pay for this upgrade, since generators at gas stations are
necessary to fuel the generators running other critical facilities after a storm, like hospitals.
While some articles argued that cities should adopt rules requiring generators at gas
stations, others recommended uniform state standards for the sake of consistency. One
proposed bill required wiring for backup generators at certain gas stations, yet this policy
blocked city and county governments from imposing more stringent requirements, which
some claimed, “shows more concern for corporations’ best interests than for the people of
Florida” (Lugo, 2006).
Palm Beach County, however, implemented a proactive policy that nearly tripled the
number of generators available to local communities after a storm. This program allowed
communities to purchase a generator for the county which would be earmarked for that
subdivision’s pumping stations, but owned and maintained by Palm Beach County. If the
county did not need the generator after the storm, it could be used elsewhere.
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While no laws were passed requiring grocers to install generators, many did so to avoid
economic losses. Ironically, one supermarket chain actually felt that its proactive actions
were hindered by lengthy permitting processes at municipal and county levels, which slowed
down the installation of backup generators at some stores.
Problems with FEMA’s generator reimbursement program, discussed in the previous
section, were also a frequent topic relating to cross-scale governance. Governor Bush blamed
FEMA for the poor distribution of resources, claiming its “reimbursement methods are
flawed, and the policy runs counter to his message urging Floridians to be prepared for
hurricanes” (Kestin and Maines, 2005). Yet, while the program is administered by FEMA,
the state is responsible for deciding whether to participate in the program and what the
program should cover. Since Wilma, the program has been limited to reimburse generator
payments only for people who need them for medical purposes.
3.3.3 Vulnerable Populations
The third major category of articles about changes that occurred after Wilma were related
to vulnerable populations. Vulnerability is not always characterized in the same way, and
the below analysis uncovers particular narratives about vulnerability in Broward County.
For the sake of context, about 15 percent of Broward residents are age 65 or older, which is
similar to Florida’s state average (U.S. Census, 2010). About 17 percent of residents had one
or more disabilities (FL DOH, 2009), and from 2009-2013, 14.3 percent of Broward residents
lived at or below poverty level, which is slightly less than the state average. The greatest
disparity between the county and the state is the percent of foreign-born persons between
2009 and 2013. In Broward, 31.5 percent of persons are foreign-born, versus 19.4 percent for
the state of Florida (U.S. Census, 2010).
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3.3.3.1 Vulnerability Issues
Not surprisingly, the most common resilience theme in this category of articles was vulner-
ability issues, appearing 67 times and in 66 percent of the articles in the set. Vulnerability
issues are not mutually exclusive – for example, a person may be both poor, elderly and
a minority – therefore segments about vulnerability were analyzed based on the primary
issue of emphasis. Elderly populations appeared to get the most attention after Wilma,
with 19 segments discussing problems faced by this group. Power loss and solitude were
main concerns for the elderly, since many older South Floridians were left alone in high-rise
apartments without refrigeration for food and medication or elevators to leave the buildings.
Many elderly South Floridians were also displaced after the storm when their own homes
were damaged or destroyed.
In many cases, concerned family members were unable to reach elderly relatives because
phones were down and fuel for cars was di cult to come by. One former leader of Florida’s
Department of Elder a↵airs explained, “we don’t have a handle on how to find, how to get
to and how to help those great many older people who are not currently involved in getting
daily assistance from a government agency” (Hollis, 2005). One reason cited for this is that
many elderly South Floridians do not identify themselves as vulnerable, and are too proud
to seek help. Edith Lederberg, executive director of the Broward County Area Agency on
Aging echoed this concern, saying the problem is “convincing them that they are vulnerable”
(Hollis, 2005).
Homelessness and poverty were other major vulnerability concerns with respectively 14
and 12 segments referring to problems faced by these groups. In addition to displacing peo-
ple from their homes, the storm compounded problems faced by people who were already
homeless before the storm struck. One article described the system that helps homeless peo-
ple as “critically overburdened” (Hirschman, 2006), while another remarked that “Hurricane
Wilma shredded the thin, always-frail safety net that supports the homeless and working
poor in South Florida” (Collie and Lewis, 2005).
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Power outages caused tons of refrigerated and frozen items in food pantries to spoil,
and because schools closed during Wilma, the Salvation Army’s school food drives were
suspended, reducing another critical source of supplies. At the same time, the storm impacts
caused demand for resources to surge, since many people were at least temporarily unable
to earn a paycheck. Another complication of the relief e↵ort was that people who were
homeless before Wilma were arriving at storm shelters to live there instead of at regular
homeless shelters. Even when these formerly homeless people were relocated to regular
shelters, some continued to return.
The lack of a↵ordable housing in Broward also compounded problems for the poor,
especially those displaced from their homes by Wilma. Even before the storm, apartments
were being converted to condominiums and mobile home parks were rezoning for townhomes
and other developments priced out of residents’ means. Some feared that Wilma would
exacerbate owners selling to developers so displaced families would not be able to find a
new, a↵ordable place to live.
The final noteworthy vulnerable group in this article set, mentioned in 6 segments,
was foreign-born people and racial or ethnic minorities. One particular subset of concern
was undocumented migrant workers, thousands of whom were left homeless or jobless by
Hurricane Wilma yet unable to qualify for unemployment, food stamps or federal disaster
assistance – or too afraid to seek help for fear of deportation. Once able to return to work,
some people worked 15-hour days without overtime, at $6.15 an hour to try making up for
lost wages, as noted in one particular example. Other complaints filed nearly 7 months after
the storm alleged that FEMA inspectors ignored or conducted superficial investigations of
one community’s damage, “because they are poor, predominantly non-white and had limited
English skills” (Deere, 2006).
59
3.3.3.2 Social Networks
The theme of social networks was the second most common in the vulnerable populations
article set, appearing in 33 segments and in 36 percent of the articles. Ten of the segments
referred to the role of religious institutions after Wilma, which is only slightly greater than
the numbers of segments referring to the role of family and friends (9 segments) and neigh-
bors and community members (8 segments). Five segments also referred to the kindness of
strangers in helping with Wilma recovery.
Following Wilma, churches and synagogues were specifically called upon by Broward
County’s mayor to respond to the storm’s destruction, particularly to help community mem-
bers find shelter as designated hurricane shelters were becoming full. One article mentioned
a Palm Beach County church that had been housing residents left homeless by the storm,
however this act resulted in a legal dispute with Palm Beach for “operating a homeless shelter
in violation of county ordinances” (Deere and Hood, 2006). Other churches and synagogues
in both Broward and Palm Beach served communities by providing hot meals to members,
and some parishioners served the broader community by donating time and money to plan
a large holiday banquet for poor and homeless community members. In fact, article seg-
ments about the role of religious institutions greatly emphasized not only what the church
was doing for its members, but what members were doing to help the church recover. For
example, an extermination company helped one church cover its roof and provided fans to
dry the interior. Also, one of the homeless residents of the Palm Beach church, mentioned
earlier, donated money to have the power restored there.
Broward County residents were also encouraged to turn to friends and family for housing
after the storm, leaving shelters as a last resort. According to one article, those in shelters
were mostly “single women with children who say they live paycheck to paycheck” (Wyman
et al., 2005). In some cases people did stay with family and friends when Wilma damaged
their homes, and in other cases people sent their children to stay with friends while they tried
securing shelter. Although the state encourages the elderly to live outside of nursing homes
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and assisted living facilities, many in South Florida do not have nearby friends or family
to take care of them during emergencies, and reaching out-of-town family can be di cult if
communication or transportation are a↵ected.
Community members without nearby friends and family sometimes relied on other mem-
bers of the local community, or even on the kindness of strangers for help after Wilma struck.
According to one article, “Everybody in the neighborhood pitches in and tries to help... Peo-
ple who get food stamps share food. Nobody has groceries...” (Collie and Lewis, 2005). In
another editorial, a Palm Beach rabbi commented that there was not enough reporting about
the positive impacts of this traumatic event, like the “countless acts of heroic proportions
where neighbors were assisting those in need” (Shapiro, 2005).
The city of Tamarac also heralded its more than one hundred volunteers who donated
time at the community center after the storm, as well as the many more who went door to
door to conduct wellness checks on elderly residents and canvas the community to identify
individual needs. The city manager even wrote in an editorial, “Friends and relatives are best
able to look out for loved ones, but when they can’t be there, we in Tamarac are committed
to helping to meet this need” (Miller, 2005). Another person willing to meet this need was
a nurse name Juanita Antley, who made it her personal responsibility to care for 70 elderly
patients assigned to her team’s care before and after Hurricane Wilma. She and four fellow
nurses provided food supplies and pre-filled medications, sometimes dipping into their own
hurricane supplies.
3.3.3.3 Benefit-Risk Distribution
The only theme to occur in all three article sets was benefit-risk distribution, which was the
third most common theme in articles about vulnerable populations. This theme appeared 33
times in 38 percent of the articles in this set. By and large, the most frequent discussion about
the distribution of risks and benefits revolved around options for people seeking housing after
being displaced by Hurricane Wilma.
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One discussion centered on the benefits of moving people out of shelters and temporarily
into hotels, apartments or trailers while they sought permanent housing and filed applications
for federal relief. A Hollywood family was grateful to receive help from the city to leave the
crowded gym where they were living on cots, though many others were not as fortunate. In
Broward County, o cials avoided using a special federal relief fund that could move people
from shelters in favor of prioritizing aid applications; However, nearly a month after Wilma,
o cials began to reconsider - especially after criticism from FEMA.
County commissioners stated that the provided mobile homes, travel trailers and rental
assistance were “far from adequate” (Wyman, 2005), yet suggestions to move hurricane
victims into hotels were thwarted, with tourism o cials claiming the influx of out-of-town
recovery workers and electric crews left few rooms available. Hotels were also nearly fully
booked because of the approaching winter tourist season and upcoming conventions. When
a public information o cial from FEMA questioned Broward’s decision not to cancel con-
ventions to make room, one o cial responded, “As if the $350 million in damage that the
county has already sustained isn’t enough, they want us to sustain the economic damage of
canceling conventions?...You’re talking about people’s jobs” (Wyman and Renaud, 2005).
Instead, commissioners said they would be willing to pick up the cost of hotels in Orlando.
Longer-term housing solutions were described as “equally elusive” (anonymous editorial,
2005a). State and federal rental assistance caps did not reflect South Florida’s higher costs
of living, which was “in short supply and expensive even before the storm” (Wyman, 2005).
In 2005 alone, Broward lost 27 percent of its rental pool of complexes with 110 units or more
because owners can obtain higher prices by converting from apartment to condo (Malernee,
2005). Furthermore, a↵ordable housing advocates promoting best practices from other parts
of the country were said to receive “fierce political opposition from builders, Realtors and
some elected o cials who object to solutions that might hurt their bottom line in the short
run but ultimately produce big benefits” (anonymous editorial, 2005a).
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3.4 Discussion: Factors A↵ecting Resilience in Broward
The results above reflect issues related to general resilience in Broward County, as discussed
in three sets of newspaper articles written after Hurricane Wilma. The analytical framework
for the article review was based on existing resilience theories, and the methods used here
were intended to draw out surrogates for resilience, which are forward-looking proxies for
assessing resilience in social-ecological systems (Berkes and Seixas, 2005; Carpenter et al.,
2005).
The results are not intended as a thorough review of the policies, programs, or issues
discussed therein because specific policies and procedures may have changed since these
articles were written. However, the underlying social and political structures that led to
particular governance choices or outcomes are still likely prevalent, and it is these structures
that are the focus of this research.
The question now is, how can these surrogates help estimate the general resilience of
Broward County and inform opportunities for resilience-building?
3.4.1 Benefit-Risk Distribution & Accountability
The distribution of benefits and risks in Broward appeared as a concern across all three
article sets, and its related theme of accountability was also prevalent in articles about
FPL. In all three sets, articles suggested or explicitly stated that after Wilma, benefits
disproportionately accrued to powerful entities, leaving more vulnerable groups at risk. In
the FPL set, the corporation was said to benefit during recovery by passing its financial risks
on to customers; The article set about generators recapped a reimbursement program that,
when viewed in hindsight, favored middle- and upper- class Floridians; In the article set
about vulnerable populations, builders and Realtors benefited from converting apartments
to condos, which consequently posed risks to lower income individuals seeking a↵ordable
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housing. While these examples might highlight exceptions rather than the rule in Broward,
they nonetheless contribute to lessons for improving general resilience.
While rate-regulated monopolies benefit customers by using economies of scale to buy
energy cheaply and provide it to customers reliably, it is essential for regulators to hold such
entities accountable to customers. In the specific case of FPL, that may or may not mean
transitioning the PSC from an appointed to an elected body, as one article suggested. More
generally, Broward may benefit from considering what the diversification of energy provision
may look like at the city or county levels in order to temper their reliance on FPL. Some
Florida cities are already providing their own energy to di↵erent levels of success, while
others are using the existing grid to integrate alternative forms of energy, like solar. While
in some places “o↵-the-grid” living allows some individuals to become empowered through
energy independence, Floridians face legal barriers which require homes to be connected to
an electricity grid and running water source, as per the International Property Maintenance
Code. This research does not conclude that any of these options is optimal, however it
does reveal that Broward’s general resilience may benefit from considering the trade-o↵s
associated with economies of scale operating locally.
In the articles about generator issues following Wilma, the implementation of FEMA’s
generator reimbursement program seemed obviously flawed in hindsight. However, to their
credit, e↵ective communication between county and state o cials resulted in the modification
of this program to provide reimbursements only to those with medical needs. While this may
prevent middle- and upper- income households from receiving unnecessary aid, it might not
address the problem that low-income individuals would find it more di cult to a↵ord up
front generator costs, and then wait for a reimbursement. County and other programs for
people with special needs would need to coordinate to alleviate this potential issue. Two
broad insights can be gained here: 1) Cross-scale and multilevel communication must be
fostered to understand and improve the way state and federal programs are implemented
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on-the-ground; and 2) Post-disaster relief programs should be regularly assessed to ensure
aid will reach places it is most needed.
Benefits and risks associated with a↵ordable housing problems faced by lower-income
people after Wilma, highlighted the need not only to balance the distribution of benefits
across space, but also across time. As one article mentioned, a↵ordable housing advocates
believed decision-makers and other influential entities were making choices that would sacri-
fice long-term social benefits for short-term economic gains. Whether or not these claims are
justified, they do highlight the need to carefully consider and assess how short-term benefits
could a↵ect longer-term goals. This lesson could also be inferred from discussions in the FPL
article set about burying power lines. In that case, the short-term goal of becoming more
resistant to wind storms must be considered in the context of the longer-term issue of rising
seas.
3.4.2 Learning and Memory
The theme of learning and memory was prominent in both the FPL and generator article
sets. In the FPL articles, there was indeed an emphasis on learning from Hurricane Wilma to
better prepare the grid for future storms. Interestingly, however, FPL was widely criticized
by customers who believed their concerns about grid conditions were not being heard, yet at
the same time, the company hired a Netherlands-based firm to examine FPL’s performance
during Wilma, as well as its ongoing maintenance. While this formal and thorough analysis
surely provided lessons for FPL, considerably less value seems to have been placed on local
knowledge, which “is often a critical aspect to managing for resilience” (Garmestani and
Benson, 2013).
Also, as mentioned above in Section 4.2.1, many articles in the generator set mentioned
people who learned from Wilma that a generator is essential for storm preparation. This
and many other typical storm preparations, however, may enhance path dependencies by
increasing dependence on fossil fuels. Furthermore, widely promoting just a few tools that
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can help in storm recovery could decrease the diversity of solutions available after the storm
hits. Instead of placing such a strong emphasis on generators, it could be worthwhile to
explore other ways people can increase their self-su ciency in the days following a storm.
Coral Springs, for instance, diversified their energy supply and reduced fossil fuel dependence
by integrating solar tra c signals into their transportation network. Some individuals also
boasted about how well their solar panels served them following Hurricane Wilma, although
solar panels can be quite pricey. In short, the lesson learned here is that it is important to
learn from past storms, but these lessons could be limited by various constraints. Wilma
was a relatively dry, but very windy storm, so generators were emphasized. Future storms
could pose a much di↵erent set of problems, so no past solution should be perceived as a
silver bullet.
3.4.3 Cross-Scale Issues
Articles that related to cross-scale and multilevel governance highlighted the success of some
local programs, such as Palm Beach County’s highly acclaimed generator program, which
empowered communities in a mutually-beneficial program with local government (See Section
4.2.3). At the same time, larger-scale, more centralized programs, like FEMA’s generator
reimbursement program, tended to reflect less positive outcomes. The lesson here is not
necessarily that local programs are universally superior to more centralized programs, espe-
cially since higher-level programs usually have more resources at-hand. However, from these
articles one may infer the value of allowing enough flexibility in centralized policies to suit
local needs and contexts.
3.4.4 Vulnerability & Social Networks
Finally, in regard to vulnerable populations, Broward County seems to want to prioritize
vulnerable people in disaster response through its Vulnerable Populations Registry. This is
a county-managed resource to help cities’ emergency responders better plan for recoveries
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from hurricanes and other emergencies. While in theory, this Registry has the potential to
be a valuable tool, discussions with city and county employees revealed that the number of
registrants is worryingly low. The Registry does not require people to pre-qualify in any
way, and the Registry website characterizes vulnerable residents with the following: “The
Vulnerable Population Registry is for residents who are at risk due to disability, frailty or
health issues, regardless of age, who elect to stay at home in the event of a hurricane or
other emergency” (Broward County, 2015c). In one newspaper article, the chairman of a
task force that developed the Registry’s guidelines explained that they made the decision
not to qualify people because the process can be cumbersome. He further clarified, however,
that the Registry should include, “people who would be in trouble if the electricity goes
out or if they are cut o↵ from caregivers. It might be someone who relies on machines for
oxygen or kidney dialysis. It might be a senior or disabled person who would be unable to
walk down the stairs if elevators stop working. It might be a low-income person with no
independent means to get food” (Kaye, 2007).
These descriptions leave ambiguity about who should actually be signing up for this
Registry. On the website and in most descriptions, it appears to be geared toward elderly
and disabled populations. In fact, every photo on the website depicts an elderly or disabled
person. Based on the article review, this may be problematic since elderly people may not
identify themselves as frail, disabled, or otherwise vulnerable, or they may be unwilling to
register if they perceive it as taboo to request government assistance. Also, people with
health issues may not register since they qualify for other programs, and can be hospitalized
or placed in special needs shelters if a disaster strikes. In fact, the website redirects people
with special needs to another place, saying “The Vulnerable Population Registry does not
automatically register you for a special needs shelter or evacuation transportation. For
sheltering and transportation information visit broward.org/AtRisk and Special Medical
Needs” (Broward County, 2015c).
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Furthermore, despite a single statement in the newspaper article cited in the first para-
graph of this section, there is no mention that low-income people can or should register, nor is
there mention of other vulnerable groups highlighted by the articles, such as single mothers,
non-English speakers, and undocumented persons. There is also stipulation that registering
for the list may not result in any special services or priority for emergency response, which
might lead one to wonder why they should register.
A lesson learned here is that the Vulnerable Populations Registry could bring more
attention to the needs of certain vulnerable groups, but it is unclear which groups would
benefit and how. People also seem hesitant to identify themselves as vulnerable. Perhaps
there needs to be a more coherent e↵ort to promote the Registry and reframe the way
vulnerable populations are represented for the sake of clarity and for reducing associated
stigmas.
According to a study by the Migration Policy Institute (2016), over 632,000 undocu-
mented immigrants live in Florida - nearly 41 percent of them in South Florida. Undocu-
mented workers face an exceptional problem in times of crisis since they do not qualify for
most recovery aid, and may be wary about providing any personal information for fear of
repercussions. Nevertheless, according to a 2013 report, undocumented workers contributed
hundreds of millions of dollars to Florida’s state and local governments (Institute on Taxa-
tion and Economic Policy, 2013). While this is not a problem that Broward can or should
face on its own, the magnitude of this issue warrants greater attention, and empowering
migrant advocacy groups could be a starting point.
The pre-existing homeless population is also under exceptional stress after disasters.
Conversely, the homeless crisis in South Florida also puts pressure on resources for peo-
ple seeking assistance following a disturbance event. The fact that homeless people were
being turned away from storm shelters and bussed to regular homeless shelters highlights
their marginalized status, and raises questions about how homeless people could be further
integrated into the community rather than excluded from it.
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Lastly, social networks are often relied upon in South Florida (and other places) follow-
ing disasters. The county and state even made explicit pleas after Wilma for community
members to rely more on one another rather than on shelters or other government assistance
programs. However, many vulnerable populations may not have strong social networks in
the event of a disaster. For example, single women with children often end up at shelters
and elderly retirees may not have family nearby. While a greater investigation of social
networks and their role in disaster recovery in Broward County is needed, it may be valuable
to consider ways social networks could be fostered in the region.
3.5 Conclusions & Recommendations
In conclusion, this analysis of Sun-Sentinel articles written after Hurricane Wilma bolsters
current resilience research by investigating how the concept of resilience functions across spa-
tial and temporal scales. By using Hurricane Wilma as a reference point, selected newspaper
articles uncovered how responses to this acute natural disaster reflected Broward County’s
perceived “capacity for adaptation, learning, and transformation” (IPCC, 2014b).
The results of this chapter provided certain insights about resilience surrogates which
may warrant special attention as the county actively develops programs and tools to adapt
to climate change and sea level rise. This research proposes that e↵orts to deal with sea
level rise and other uncertain or unpredictable hazards could be more e↵ective if placed in
a context that considers the adaptive capacity of individuals and households comprising the
community. Some initial recommendations for building general resilience in Broward, below,
are based on the most commonly occurring themes that appeared in the three article groups
that were analyzed:
Recommendation 1: Develop an updated Broward County vulnerable population profile
for integration into emergency management and/or recovery plans with special consideration
of socially marginalized vulnerable groups. Although Broward’s Community Recovery Plan
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prioritizes vulnerable populations during recovery (defining vulnerable populations as “spe-
cial need, low-income, elderly, transportation disadvantaged, cultural barriers, etc., (BCEM,
2011)) this news article analysis revealed that vulnerable groups who are more socially stig-
matized, such as the homeless, low-income, and undocumented persons, may face exceptional
hardships during times of crisis. These groups may also have less access to post-disaster (or
other) government assistance, which is intended to provide a safety net for the most vul-
nerable members of our society. After Wilma, pre-existing homeless people were removed
from storm shelters, low-income people were less capable of participating in reimbursement
programs, and undocumented persons were ineligible for aid, despite their likely tax contri-
butions (Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, 2013). To reduce stress on government
resources during times of crisis, Broward could become more resilient by taking proactive
steps before a crisis to reduce the vulnerability of these groups by, for example, investing
more in programs to help homeless people reintegrate into the community. Furthermore,
greater consideration of vulnerable populations can lead to a more just distribution of social
and economic benefits and risks.
Recommendation 2: Reframe and clarify the purpose and goals of the Vulnerable Popu-
lations Registry based on research about how vulnerable groups self-identify. The Vulnerable
Populations Registry could play a major role in collecting and compiling information about
vulnerable people in Broward; However, the Registry needs to be more clear about what
vulnerability means in this context. An administrator from the county’s Human Services
Department commented, “Not everyone who’s vulnerable is registered... We would like to
ensure we capture as many people as possible who may feel vulnerable” (Guanche, 2008).
Yet in reality, many people who are vulnerable after a disaster may not feel they are vul-
nerable, in general. Even if they do, they may be unwilling to ask for help. Future research
should include an investigation of how vulnerable groups self-identify, and what forms of
assistance could be considered acceptable and/or useful. The results of such research could
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help re-frame the Vulnerable Populations Registry to boost the number of people who sign
up.
Recommendation 3: Create and foster opportunities for community members to share
local knowledge and past experiences, highlighting innovative solutions. Memories of past
experiences were found to contribute to the way people prepared for predictable disasters,
however, past experiences also limited the range of options people considered for becoming
better prepared. Innovative strategies for preparation, self-su ciency, and recovery at the
individual or household level may enhance the county’s general resilience. Larger-scale cor-
porations or other institutions in Broward would also do well to integrate local knowledge
into their preparation and recovery planning to understand how large-scale problems are
experienced on-the-ground.
Recommendation 4: Review existing programs to determine how the risks and benefits of
policies or programs will be distributed across populations, space and time. The newspaper
analysis revealed that in hindsight, some post-disaster programs (like the FEMA generator
reimbursement program) did not benefit groups who needed them most. As such, the county
should review its recovery processes and post-disaster assistance programs (especially those
that work across levels of government) to eliminate or modify programs that inappropriately
allocate resources. Furthermore, proposed solutions to a specified problem at one time scale
(for example, burying power lines to reduce wind damage) must also consider longer-term
consequences (like the impacts of sea level rise or increased storm surge on buried lines).
While the outcomes of this research did not reveal specific ways that post-Wilma recov-
ery hurt or helped general resilience, it did provide a useful frame for looking at how general
resilience could play a role during or after a specified disturbance event. The recommen-
dations here are not proposed as a silver bullet for building general resilience in Broward
County. Instead, they can serve as a foundation for discussion or future research about
helping Broward address future disasters, both known and unknown.
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Chapter 4
The Social Nature of Adaptation:
Post-Disaster Insights from Broward County, Florida
4.1 Introduction
Natural hazards are the result of a complex interaction of physical and human forces which
are either amplified or ameliorated by various social, economic, and political influences (see
for example, Oliver-Smith, 1996; Quarantelli, 1997; Wisner et al., 2004; Hartman and Squires,
2006). As such, addressing the social and cultural aspects of hazards, in addition to technical
and physical elements, is imperative for risk-reduction during all phases of a disaster from
mitigation and preparedness to response and recovery (Nakagawa and Shaw, 2004; Heyd and
Brooks, 2009; Aida et al., 2013).
The modern disaster paradigm defines a disaster not by the source of physical damage,
but by the coping patterns, inputs and outputs of social systems (Birkmann, 2006; Perry,
2007). For example, research supports that cooperation and trust between governments
and civil society promotes the legitimacy and sustainability of climate adaptation strategies
(Adger, 2003). Moreover, Fleming et al. (2014) posit that social norms, networks, attitudes
and reciprocity of individuals in a community can be key factors in both economic and
social recovery following a disaster event. When studying the social dimensions of hazards,
then, investigating how a community has dealt with the various phases of a discrete disaster
can provide valuable lessons for continuous, large-scale disasters. For example, compared
to climate change, hurricanes occur at much smaller spatial and temporal scales. However,
impacts to climate-related extremes, like hurricanes, can “reveal significant vulnerability
and exposure of some ecosystems and many human systems to current climate variability”
(IPCC, 2014b, p.7)
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This research draws primarily from the theoretical works of Adger et al. (2003) and
Abramson et al. (2015), using focus groups to assess qualitatively: 1) how can climate adap-
tation and disaster resilience be constrained by individual and social characteristics, such as
trust and risk perception, and 2) what community and social resources can promote individ-
ual and/or community adaptive capacity? This work adds to the body of knowledge about
resilience by contextualizing these theories and applying them to a study of a geographic
location that is particularly hurricane-prone. While previous research has investigated levels
of preparedness during the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons in Florida (Baker, 2011), social
variables such as perceived and expected risk and previous disaster experience remain less
explored.
4.2 Background and Theoretical Framework
4.2.1 Adaptive Capacity
Adaptation comprises two components, adaptive capacity and adaptive action (Pelling,
2011). The relationship between adaptive capacity and action is iterative: capacity drives
action, which can either promote or inhibit future adaptive capacity (Pelling and Zaidi,
2013). Along with the concept of resilience, adaptive capacity is a central concept in discus-
sions about natural hazards, including climate change. Adaptive capacity has been defined
as “The ability of systems, institutions, humans and other organisms to adjust to poten-
tial damage, to take advantage of opportunities, or to respond to consequences” (IPCC,
2014a, p.118). Building adaptive capacity can both reduce vulnerability and enhance a sys-
tem’s overall resilience while also considering the diversity and distribution of resources and
facilitating the visioning of multiple futures to address uncertainty (Brown, 2011).
Among the innovative ways that adaptive capacity is being evaluated is the Adaptive
Capacity Index, or ACI (Pelling and Zaidi, 2013). Focusing primarily on institutional ca-
pacities, the ACI was developed around five sub-components: improving foresight, critical
self-reflection, organizational structure, support for experiments, and resources to enable
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adjustments (Pelling and Zaidi, 2013). The ACI measures institutional adaptive capacity
through quantitative and qualitative data from interviews with local government authorities.
While the ACI focuses on the important role of institutions, our research examines the role
individuals can have in e↵ecting community adaptation.
4.2.2 Social Limits to Adaptation
Studies typically highlight ecological, physical, economic, and technological variables as fac-
tors limiting adaptation (Adger, 2003). However, understanding social limits to adaptation
is equally or more important than attempting to control nature using technological means
(Tobin and Montz, 2004; Haque and Etkin, 2007). Based on an extensive, interdisciplinary
review, Adger et al. (2003) propose (among other things) that individuals, and the societies
they comprise, act based on social and cultural norms and values. Individuals beliefs, pref-
erences, self-e cacy and sense of control combine with risk perceptions, past experiences,
norms and values to determine individual and societal limits to adaptation (Adger, 2003).
Yet, these socially constructed limits to adaptation are not fixed, and can often be overcome
once they are identified (Adger, 2003).
4.2.3 Resilience Activation Framework
Abramson et al. (2015) further explore how limits to adaptation can be overcome with their
Resilience Activation Framework (RAF). The RAF is intended to improve access to social
resources, thereby promoting positive adaptation (Abramson et al., 2015). While their frame-
work emphasizes outcomes related to mental and behavioral health for individuals exposed
to risk, it remains highly relevant to this study due to its focus on the interplay between com-
munity and individual resilience attributes to access or engage social resources, and has thus
been modified to integrate individual adaptability beyond mental health outcomes (Figure
4.1).
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Figure 4.1: Modified Resilience Activation Framework. Conceptual model adapted from
Abramson et al. (2015).
According to Abramson et al. (2015), individual and community resilience attributes are
co-constructive, and access to, or engagement with, social resources can activate individual
resilience attributes. For example, individuals are likely to be more resilient (self-su cient,
adaptable, able to cope, etc.) if they live in a community with equitable, capable governance
structures and haves access to adequate education, health care, and other social resources.
4.3 Methods
To understand what characteristics may influence adaptation policy and adaptive capacity
in Broward County, Florida, homeowners from the cities of Dania Beach, Hollywood and
Fort Lauderdale participated in a series of small, semi-structured focus groups, approved
by the University of South Florida’s Institutional Review Board. Dania Beach, Hollywood,
and Fort Lauderdale are adjacent cities in Broward’s southernmost coastal region, and were
among some of the hardest hit when Hurricane Wilma struck in 2005 (Figure 4.2). Though
the hurricane struck Broward County as a category two storm, it was the fifth costliest
hurricane to strike the United States (Torres and Alsharif, 2016).
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Homeowners (including condominium unit owners) were selected as the target popula-
tion rather than renters since they were assumed to be more willing and able to invest in
adaptive actions to prepare for and adapt to potential future disturbances. Additionally,
homeowners were assumed to provide an accessible pool of eligible participants, especially
since this study sought longer-term residents with a history of hurricane experience who lived
in Broward at least since the time Wilma struck in 2005.
Figure 4.2: Homeowners from Fort Lauderdale, Dania Beach, and Hollywood participated
in focus groups.
To select a sample of homeowners for focus groups,“gatekeepers” from city and county
governments were reached via email or phone to provide contact information for civic groups
or other local organizations whose members might be eligible and willing to participate.
Homeowner association presidents were also reached via publicly available contact informa-
tion and asked to reach out to members, and advertisements were posted in print and on-line
in local news outlets including the Sun-Sentinel and New Times Broward.
76
Five one- to two-hour focus groups were conducted in late July and early August 2015.
Two focus groups one in the morning and one in the afternoon were scheduled for each
city to create opportunities to meet di↵erent homeowners’ availabilities and convenience.
Homeowners could attend a focus group in whichever city they preferred, yet most chose to
participate in the one located in their city of residence. Only one focus group was held in
Dania Beach, due to the low response rate there. With fourteen participants, Hollywood
had the highest participation rate. Twenty-two homeowners participated in all, with seven
participants in the largest group, and three in the smallest.
Focus groups were advantageous for qualitative data collection in this study because
they allowed direct and immediate interaction with respondents and promoted exchange
and debate among the participants (Stewart et al., 2007; Gomez and Jones, 2010). Since
Hurricane Wilma occurred nearly ten years prior to the focus groups, such active discussion
was intended to help reignite memories about the event.
To guide focus group discussions, a semi-structured questionnaire was utilized beginning
with questions about Hurricane Wilma experiences, preparation, recovery and expectations
from government. The questionnaire responses provided insights about post-disaster recovery
and redevelopment; climate and sea-level rise; perceptions of adaptations on a personal
scale; and awareness of adaptation e↵orts across various levels of governance, including
mitigation and preparation phases of disaster planning. Follow-up questions were asked to
elicit greater detail from participants on their perceptions and understanding of adaptation
measures. Each focus group was recorded on video and audio-recorded with consent, and
then transcribed for analysis.
After conducting and transcribing the focus groups’ comments, data were uploaded into
a qualitative data analysis software program (MAXQDA). Data were analyzed initially for
word frequency and visualizations were created to give an overall impression of commonly
occurring topics for each focus group. Prepositions, pronouns, contractions and single let-
ters were removed from the visualizations using stop lists (Figure 4.3). Next, focus group
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transcripts were examined in detail by a single coder, highlighting substantive statements
from participants. Content was considered substantive if it comprised a coherent statement
relevant to the research agenda, as opposed to tangential conversation, requests to repeat
a question, et cetera. After reading and highlighting the transcripts, they were re-read and
segments were categorized into themes created using Mayrings (2000) step model of inductive
category development.
Figure 4.3: This visualization provides a snapshot of overall word frequencies for all focus
groups combined, excluding certain commonly occurring parts of speech. Larger text is
associated with greater word frequency.
There are limitations associated with this research. For instance, the focus group par-
ticipants were not representative of the target population of homeowners, that is, those
residents of Hollywood, Fort Lauderdale and Dania Beach. The low numbers participating,
and the fact that most focus groups were held on weekdays, when a large portion of the
population may have been at work, suggest that this was not a representative sample of
the population. Additionally, the focus groups were held during the summer, when many
South Florida homeowners are traveling to cooler climates, according to some homeowner
and civic association board members. Furthermore, perceptions may vary depending on in-
dividuals’ locations within their floodplain/storm surge zone, and their individual exposure
to sea-level impacts, yet exact addresses were not collected for the sake of participant privacy
and confidentiality.
Of the twenty-two participants, five were male and seventeen were female, potentially
skewing results toward female perspectives. This over-representation of women could be due
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to a number of factors, including previous research showing a greater concern for environ-
mental issues among women (Mohai, 1992; Milfont and Sibley, 2016).
A comparison of the demographic traits of the participants in the focus group and census
data revealed that 68 percent of participants self-identified as white, versus the nearly 39
percent of white, non-Hispanic residents in Broward, estimated by the U.S. Census for 2015.
About 24 percent self-identified as Hispanic compared to about 28 percent in the county.
Additionally, of the fourteen participants who disclosed a household income, about 64 percent
reported $100,000 or more compared to the county median household income of $51,574 (Fort
Lauderdale, Dania Beach, and Hollywood median household incomes for 2013 were estimated
at $49,263, $41,291, and $44,582, respectively by city-data.com). These discrepancies could
indicate greater concern among these groups, but more likely reflects factors that constrain
lower-income groups’ participation, like work schedule flexibility. Finally, of the sixteen
participants who disclosed their education level, 87.5 percent had earned a baccalaureate
degree or higher, as compared to 30.2 percent for the county in 2015.
Due to the relatively small sample size, generalizable statistical comparisons between
di↵erent subsets of the target population would likely be invalid. However, the qualitative
data that emerged from the focus groups provides rich insight about local experiences, culture
and values which may transcend the study area by providing perspectives about the role
di↵erent social factors play in activating individual and community adaptive capacity.
4.4 Results and Discussion
Analysis of the focus group data revealed three major themes which should have implications
for adaptive capacity in the study areas. First, there were notable insights about the way
respondents perceived risks associated with both hurricanes and large-scale environmental
change like sea-level rise. The second theme emphasized the interplay between risk percep-
tions and insurance policies. Third, participants shed light on the role of social networks
and political trust in the contexts of disaster preparation and recovery.
79
4.4.1 Risk Perceptions
According to Adger et al. (2009), risk is one of the areas whose role warrants special at-
tention when investigating the social construction of adaptation limits because individuals
perceptions of hazards influence their behavioral responses. Thus, risk perceptions can either
enhance or limit e↵ective preparation and response, depending on their accuracy (Haynes
et al., 2008; Tobin and Montz, 2009; Tobin et al., 2011). Prior experience, socio-economic
contexts, individual attributes, and individual well-being are some factors that have been
considered in risk perception (Tobin et al., 2011). However, factors a↵ecting risk percep-
tion can be di cult to pinpoint, since people often face multiple risks simultaneously, and
background risks can influence their decision-making processes (Ahsan, 2014). In addition,
such factors as disaster experience, social networks, and culture, among others, can lead to
di↵erent outcomes serving to either amplify or attenuate risk perception depending on other
intervening variables (Jones et al., 2013).
4.4.1.1 Hurricane Wilma
Based on responses from focus groups, most participants underestimated the threat of Hur-
ricane Wilma, whereas in reality the storm wreaked havoc across much of Broward County,
damaging homes, leveling vegetation, and leaving many residents without electricity for
weeks. Six participants mentioned that they were not concerned because the storm was
arriving from the west across land, rather than from the Atlantic Ocean to the east, so they
knew storm surge would not be an issue. Many underestimated the storm because, in the
words of one participant, “...they never called it more than a one or a tiny little two.”
Participants also remarked that they were not adequately notified about the storm,
placing accountability on meteorologists’ flawed projections and on local o cials who did
not give notice to evacuate. The following comments came from three separate individuals
in two di↵erent focus groups:
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“I mean, for Andrew they were evacuating everybody from everywhere, but we
didn’t even get evacuated. I live right on the coast, too.”
“...it occurred to me that we should’ve been notified by somebody to leave the
building, because normally if there’s a hurricane, that area is emptied, and we
hadn’t been notified by anybody to leave the building.”
“We didn’t hear anything. I mean, normally they make the people that are on
the beach move when there’s a hurricane coming. Nobody told us to move.”
Yet, conversations with county o cials revealed that evacuations are not typical for
west-entering storms of this magnitude because of the reduced risk of storm surge. In this
case, participants perceived the risk as less threatening because of their belief someone would
have told them to leave if any damage was expected. Just two months before Wilma, many
of the same participants had been evacuated from their homes for Hurricane Katrina, which
caused relatively little damage in Broward, so they assumed Wilma would be less severe.
For the most part, however, people believed their experiences with past storms led
them to be more prepared than in the past. For example, one respondent commented,
“Each hurricane we do something else. After Andrew we made sure we had cash in the
house. Before Andrew, cash is not something that occurred to us.”
When asked whether they prepared for the storm despite expectations that it would
be minor, multiple participants said they had, citing the amount of time they had lived in
Florida as an indicator of preparedness:
“I was well prepared for Wilma. I was born and raised in Miami, witnessed
Donna, Cleo and Betsy in the 60’s... My home is completely boarded up. We
had a generator. We had plenty of fuel...”
“We were well prepared. We’ve been in Florida for a little over 10 years. We
have hurricane shutters. We have food and fuel and cash and stu↵ like that.”
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“Our house... We, too, have hurricane shutters we have gas and we’ve lived here
for over 40 years so we were prepared.”
The implication here was either that more experience with hurricanes amplified percep-
tions of risk, or that more experience increased knowledge of potential storm impacts and
fostered preparedness.
Despite being personally prepared, many feeling over-prepared, for the immediate direct
impacts of the storm, members in all five focus groups agreed that they neither expected
nor prepared for the aftermath’s extent and time it would take to recover. While two
participants had electricity restored to their condominium buildings within just two days,
nearly everyone else was out of electricity for weeks, with one participant going without
electricity for twenty-six days. Grocery stores lost power, and had no frozen or refrigerated
foods to sell; gas stations had gas, but no way to access it, causing problems even for those
who had generators; stoplights were out, and roads were piled with debris, creating what
many described as “scary” driving conditions.
One participant thought he was prepared for the aftermath, remarking, “...they say, you
know, get three or four days of food, and that long ran out. I didn’t know it was going to be...
even though we had buried cables I didn’t know that whatever feeding our neighborhood
was probably out...”
Burying power cables was mentioned three times as something that would hopefully
reduce the risk of extended power loss in the future. One person called it “outrageous” that,
unlike Europe, Florida still has above-ground cables, noting that increasing dependence on
electronics is amplifying future risks associated with power loss. However, shown by the
previous comment, buried cables may provide a false sense of security in some parts of
Broward due to the fact that transmission structures could still be exposed. Adding to the
issue of underground power cables, other participants mentioned how sea-level rise and high
water tables were causing problems for underground wiring.
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4.4.1.2 Sea-Level Rise
Regarding impending climate change and sea-level rise impacts, levels of concern ranged
from, “I’m really, really not concerned. Not concerned at all. And I’m right on the ocean,”
to “Yeah, I think it’s very serious. And I’m very concerned about it.”
There were three main reasons participants cited for their own or others’ lack of concern
about climate change and sea-level rise. First was the belief that impacts were too far in
the future to a↵ect them personally, and maybe even too far to impact their grandchildren.
Next was the fact that a major storm had not hit Broward in such a long time, making the
potential impacts seem less tangible. Third was the assertion that hazard exposure was just
a fact of life no matter where you live, so if they were not as exposed to sea-level rise, it
would be something else.
When those who were concerned about the impacts of sea-level rise were asked if they
had considered moving to a new place that was less exposed to sea-level rise, many said no
(three people mentioned they are moving, though whether that was due to sea-level rise was
unclear).
“You can’t beat the weather,” one participant said.
“I love where I live, um, and I do want to live there as long as I can,” mentioned a
participant from another group.
However, when asked if they were doing anything to begin preparing or adapting to
sea-level rise, participants mentioned feeling helpless to do anything on their own. Some
said they had “no clue” what options existed for flood-proofing homes, and even if they did,
it would not matter unless their neighbors acted, too (for example, capping a seawall). They
also believed there were no financial incentives from insurance companies to flood-proof or
otherwise retrofit one’s home to reduce risk. The modifications that could reduce insurance
rates were perceived as too costly to be worth it.
When participants were asked what aspects of climate change and sea-level rise most
concerned them, some expressed general concerns, like the disappearance of low-lying island
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nations, the increased rate at which the Greenland ice sheet is melting, and the well-being
of freshwater supplies. However, most concerns were framed on a personal scale and these
included flooding to property, inadequate or poorly implemented building codes, and elderly
populations.
People’s concerns about flooding were linked to both potential damage and increasing
flood insurance rates. Having lived in New Orleans during Katrina, one participant wor-
ried about increasing storm surges, while another said during rain events, floodwaters are
encroaching closer and closer to her home. Two more people were worried about the value
of investment properties, with one considering selling some Florida properties and buying
property elsewhere to diversify.
A second concern of multiple participants was whether building codes were adequate,
and if the code implementation considered the possible secondary e↵ects of new requirements
to reduce flood risks. In one example, new development was cited as causing increased
flooding to a person’s home, since the land was being raised and the new structure elevated,
and rainwaters were not being adequately contained on the property. Other participants also
indicated that new development negatively impacted their neighborhoods by exacerbating
the incidence of flooding.
Vulnerable populations were a third concern, especially among those with elderly rel-
atives who might be a↵ected by intensified heat waves or flooding associated with climate
change. One person specifically mentioned the need for emergency personnel to access her
mother’s apartment, since she cannot take care of her mother alone.
4.4.2 Insurance as Social Practice
Insurance is one of the institutions that shapes and is shaped by humans’ physical and
perceived encounters with climate (Adger et al., 2009). In the face of hurricanes, storm surge
and sea-level rise, flood insurance can be a source of economic resilience for communities,
and can supplement governments’ disaster relief plans (Lo, 2013). According to Lo 2013,
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social norms rather than perceptions of flood risk or personal socio-economic characteristics
are the driving factors guiding people’s choice to purchase flood insurance, or to take any
adaptive action.
This finding was mirrored in multiple focus group discussions wherein participants were
actively debating which, if any, optional insurance policies they should keep. When asked
what they were doing di↵erently since Hurricane Wilma, one person answered, “...it did
make us, after Wilma, to cancel our hurricane insurance because it tripled in price.” Then,
a second participant responded, “Yeah, we’re thinking about that right now.” After a
discussion about the high cost, and the amount of damage that would need to occur to make
paying into a policy economically worth it, the second participant said, “I needed to hear
that.”
Although insurance was not a topic that was specifically addressed in the questionnaire,
nearly every focus group had some discussion about whether it was worthwhile to purchase
windstorm and flood insurance if it was not required. Some of the reasons why people were
considering canceling insurance policies included: 1) high costs which seemed to exceed the
amount of damage they believed was possible; 2) lack of “common sense” and communication
regarding policies; and 3) the belief that “FEMA [...] is going to come in anyway.”
Some participants had recently received letters from their banks saying they no longer
needed flood insurance, which revealed some confusion about what di↵erent policies covered:
Speaker 1: ...the bank said you don’t need flood, and I said I don’t care what
they say, but I’m paying for flood because if something happens to me I want to
make sure I’m covered. But, I don’t know if anyone else got it, but I got a letter
saying I don’t need flood.
Speaker 2: Flood will not help you.
Speaker 1: But if my house gets flooded, you get insurance for flood.
Speaker 2: Not from a hurricane.
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Speaker 3: And they say it’s wind damage, too. They call it wind damage.
Speaker 1: Okay, so I got the flood just in case I get water, because I think...winds?
Yeah, the wind, you have to have it. But the flood... you don’t have to have it?
For some people, however, flood insurance is not optional. People in Broward who have
mortgages and live in high-risk areas delineated on a FEMA flood map even if they rarely
or never experience flooding are required to purchase flood insurance through the National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). An aim of the NFIP is to “alert communities to the danger
of flooding” through their varying rates (FEMA 2011). Yet, discussions revealed that using
flood insurance rates to alert communities to flood risks can be problematic.
For example, in August 2014, FEMA finalized new flood maps for Broward, removing
about 60% of formerly high-risk land parcels from that designation and allowing those home-
owners to cancel their flood insurance (Hurtibise 2014). However, their risk exposure had
not necessarily changed. In fact, participants generally questioned the logic of using sharp
boundaries of FEMA floodplain maps to determine risk, and that mistrust of the meth-
ods used to calculate risk could also lessen perceptions of flood exposure. One participant
pointed out, “There’s no consistency at all. Yeah, it’s frustrating [...] I have a neighbor
down the street. Part of the house is in the flood zone, part of its not. Go figure.”
Another said, “...I don’t know if they really study the di↵erence and the dichotomy and
the ebbs and flows of our canal systems and how that all works.”
Moreover, even the latest maps from FEMA (which are used to determine insurance
rates and building codes) do not consider projected e↵ects of climate change or sea-level rise
(Childress and Worth 2016). Hence, risk of sea-level rise impacts, such as increased storm
surge or high-tide flooding, are surely underrepresented by flood insurance policies.
4.4.3 Social Networks
As with the purchase of flood insurance, wider adaptation choices are understood as being
dependent on how social norms, networks and interactions shape perceptions of risk (Frank
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et al., 2011). Bonding social capital is based on family, friendship, and locality, and it is
particularly important in helping low-income or vulnerable groups adapt (Hurlbert et al.,
2001; Adger, 2003; Tobin et al., 2014). Networking capital refers to the weaker, non-familial
ties between the state and civil society, which are based on trust and reciprocity (Adger
2003). Adaptive actions are most likely to occur when high levels of networking social
capital occur within a well-functioning government, creating a cross-scale synergy which
promotes learning (Adger, 2003; Lo, 2013). As such, gaining citizens’ trust contributes to
the optimum performance and stability of a successful political system (Nicholls and Picou,
2013). Furthermore, trust and reciprocity of the citizenry is argued to “enhance government
performance, reduce corruption, and decrease transaction costs, among others” (Fleming
et al., 2014).
4.4.3.1 Bonding Capital
Bonding capital, especially related to locality, clearly facilitated individuals’ capacities to
cope with the aftermath of Hurricane Wilma in Broward. These bonds were most frequently
discussed in the context of people’s nearby work, neighborhood or condominium communi-
ties. While these social networks did not necessarily include people’s most intimate family
and friends, the storm appeared to strengthen these weaker ties to improve response capaci-
ties. Below are three quotes exemplifying the sense of community people experienced within
these interpersonal networks:
Neighborhood: “The positive part, too, was the community. Like, I had a gas
hot water heater so everybody came over to my house to get a shower. And I
also had a gas dryer. So, anyway, everybody... somebody else had a gas stove,
so, you know, it all kind of worked out in that way.”
Condominium: “We’re a very friendly building. You know... I know everybody,
and I stayed down[stairs] and ate, and then I would just come up... walk up.
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And that’s what I did. Some people were kind enough that they walked up to
those people who couldn’t come out. There are people that have handicaps and
they can’t come out. You have to bring them things. We had runners, and that’s
what they did.”
Work: “Weston only went out [of electricity] for a day-and-a-half, so my boss
said, ‘Oh, yeah. You’re welcome [to stay at work]. He stayed there because in
Wilton Manors he was a month without power.”
One participant reported that his workplace set up bunk beds, and provided access to
a company gas station and cafeteria after Wilma struck. Another participant, president of
her company, leveraged out-of-town locations to bring food, gasoline, roof repair supplies,
cash, ice, and charcoal grills to their South Florida location for employees. The company
president admitted that she spent much more time preparing her workplace for a potential
hurricane strike than her home, since she felt responsible for others at work.
In multiple cases, focus group participants relied on others to come set up their storm
shutters or board up their houses, either because they were out of town or otherwise unable.
After the storm, they also reported sharing electricity. Those who had gas generators would
run extension cords to neighbors who would take turns plugging in their refrigerators for a
couple hours.
People further utilized interpersonal connections with nearby acquaintances after the
storm to facilitate repairs. After Wilma, it took years for many people to completely restore
their homes. Following the storm, FEMA brought in tarps to cover damaged roofs since
contractors were so overwhelmed. Yet some participants were able to leverage some weaker
to moderate ties in their social networks to get repairs done more quickly. For example, one
person’s neighbor was a roofer, and helped them get new roof tiles, and another was able
to forgo dealing with their insurance for roof repairs since a friend had extra tiles. A third
person knew trusted contractors through his workplace, and roof repairs were done in just
two months.
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Some participants decided to get shutters after Wilma. Unfortunately, one woman and
her friends had problems with a contracting company who took their money, but had not
taken any action after six to seven months. Thankfully, one of her friends was the mother of
a well-known news anchor and journalist who called the company to “get things moving.”
The president of the company was reportedly sent to jail.
After learning of the many ways participants relied on friends and family before, during
and after Hurricane Wilma, one might question how those without strong bonding capital
could cope with a disaster. A lesson learned from Wilma was the need to have a registry
to locate vulnerable populations. Although, one participant remembered visiting a 55-and-
older community to help deliver supplies after the storm, commenting on some potential
limitations of the Vulnerable Populations Registry:
“I was surprised. Some people really, really needed to have supplies delivered to
them. Not everybody did, but there is a need out there and I’m not sure all of
them would register for the [Vulnerable Populations Registry] program or even
know about it. So it’s important to know where the pockets of vulnerable people
live, um, and then approach them in a way that they’ll take the stu↵. I mean,
some people are just proud and it gets tricky, but there were a lot of people in
that development area that were isolated.”
Another participant described people’s lack of nearby family and isolated neighborhood
situations “scary” since people could be so vulnerable. She also noted that residents in
rental housing are probably most vulnerable since their preparation options are limited. For
example, some places do not allow residents to put up plywood or attach accordion shutters
to the outside of their windows because “they don’t look aesthetically pleasing.”
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4.4.3.2 Political Trust
Focus groups also revealed some insight about networking capital, as indicated by partici-
pants’ comments about trust and communication with di↵erent levels of government. Ac-
cording to Nicholls and Picou (2013) political trust is distinct from interpersonal trust since
it reflects expectations of what government should do and how they should do it.
Based on focus group discussions, homeowners’ political trust was strongest with gov-
ernment actors they interacted with most often, like workers and sta↵. Two participants
fondly remembered the work of City of Hollywood employees after Hurricane Wilma:
“They were just very nice and very helpful and, you know, I really thought a lot
of those gentlemen who were out there in the heat, you know, working with all
that stu↵ [debris].”
“I do think that the workers themselves go beyond, okay? I mean the firefighters
and the local response people in Hollywood have been wonderful whenever I’ve
called them [...]. They show up in no time at all. So there is a level of community
which is absolutely great.”
Focus group members were also generally pleased with local governments for the changes
being made to reduce the impacts of future hurricanes. Many people noticed gas stations,
supermarkets and condos equipping themselves with backup generators, and one participant
had even toured the county’s hurricane operations center, saying he was “really impressed”
and “the county is ready.”
When asked more generally about coastal hazards, including sea-level rise, participants
commended Broward County for taking a leadership role as a steward for adaptation, while
acknowledging their limitations, like their reliance on cities for implementation and higher
levels of government for funding. Yet many homeowners were pleased that the Southeast
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Florida Regional Climate Compact was “leading the nation in trying to be ready [for sea-
level rise],” noting, “weve got, in Broward County, some really, um, great leaders trying to
put into place something that’ll help us out.”
While local sta↵ were perceived as hardworking and trustworthy, politicians were de-
scribed as shortsighted, “thinking just right now and the next two years of their election
cycle.” The most often cited example of shortsightedness was the continued issuance of
building permits along coastal areas. In fact, four out of five focus groups brought up the is-
sue of development in their already densely built areas, and one group felt especially strongly,
“the developers own the city.” At least two participants also believed lobbyists’ desire for
more, cheaper development was hindering building codes from improving.
As scales of governance increased from county to state, homeowners’ trust appeared to
wane. While people often felt that cities’ resources were too limited to take adaptive actions,
many people did trust the county to take the lead in responding to coastal hazards because
they have seen action taking place at that level. Homeowners had little faith in the state
government, however. Some referred to the governor as being up there on the list of climate
deniers, with two people mentioning reports that he banned using the terms ‘climate change’
and ‘global warming.’
There was also a belief that the state government in Tallahassee simply did not care
about sea-level rise because they were too far away to see the impacts. One person said,
“They just see it [sea-level rise] as a South Florida problem. They don’t see it as a state
problem and that’s where they’re shortsighted.”
Another simply stated, “The state government is in Tallahassee and they’re really not
concerned with the beach.”
Two participants in di↵erent groups also mentioned Amendment 1 as evidence the state
could not be trusted with environmental issues. In November 2014, about 75% of Floridians
voted to set aside a third of the tax revenues from real-estate stamps to acquire and restore
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conservation lands in the Everglades. While many state legislators insist that money is being
spent in accordance with the intentions of Amendment 1, some participants felt betrayed:
“...it passed and the funds were there, but all the sudden the government, which
is the one that decides and puts the money where it’s supposed to, they don’t
want to do. They change their mind.”
“And they took that [money] And it was supposed to be this tremendous amount
of money to protect land and freshwater. And they just... They completely
ignored the public.”
Hence, local actors, specifically at the county level, appear to have more perceived
legitimacy than state actors, according to focus group participants.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter set out to provide insight about the individual and social resources in Broward
County that could limit adaptation or adaptability, and those that could promote individual
or community adaptive capacity. Focus groups included discussions about past experiences
with Hurricane Wilma, as well as their perceptions of local climate adaptation e↵orts.
Based on focus group discussions, risk perceptions, insurance structures, and social
networks were three things which could shape the capacity of individuals and communities
to deal with community-level hazard impacts. Specific factors within these themes that
could limit adaptation in the study areas included: inaccurate risk perceptions based on false
assumptions or feelings of helplessness; lack of transparency and inaccurate representations
of risk in insurance policies; and lack of political trust at the state level. On the other hand,
factors that could be leveraged to increase adaptive capacity may include the knowledge
reserves of long-term residents, including their local experiences with hurricanes or climate
change; the sense of community in many workplaces, condominiums and neighborhoods; and
positive perceptions of many non-elected, local government employees.
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While these findings are specific to the study sample homeowners in Dania Beach,
Hollywood and Fort Lauderdale this research has implications beyond the study area, since
it highlights the important role of individuals’ values, knowledge, experience for enabling
community adaptation. By eliciting how di↵erent variables a↵ect people’s willingness or
ability to prepare, adapt, or recover, planners and managers can develop more e↵ective
strategies to adapt to future disturbances, change and uncertainty at a community scale.
While this research has provided an indication of some of those variables that might influence
adaptive capacity, further research is necessary to explore how social networks and social
capital can be used the enhance individual and collective action to mitigate the increasing
risk associated with climate change in South Florida.
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Chapter 5
Overall Conclusions
5.1 Summary of Problem and Objectives
In the face of uncertainty about the timing and extent of climate change impacts, vulnerable
coastal communities like Broward County, Florida are struggling to balance short- and long-
term planning and adaptation needs. While resilience-building is increasingly being proposed
as a strategy to address future uncertainties, it is sometimes unclear what it means to become
“more resilient.”
The purpose of this research was to learn from past disaster experiences in Broward
County to propose more resilient pathways for climate adaptation. The research sought to
answer four primary questions: 1) How does Broward County conceptualize resilience at a
local institutional level, and how does this compare with other “resilient” communities?; 2)
What indicators, or surrogates, can be used to estimate resilience in Broward County?; 3)
How did attempts to address specified resilience after Hurricane Wilma influence, or expose
opportunities to improve, the general resilience of Broward County?; and 4) What social
limits to adaptation exist in Broward County, and what are the opportunities and challenges
for overcoming those limits?
5.2 Empirical Findings
5.2.1 Objective 1: Conceptualizing Resilience
In local planning documents and other publicly available policies and presentations about
resilience in the study areas chosen for the first phase of research (Chapter 2), explicit
definitions for the concept were generally lacking, even though these communities were noted
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for their exemplary actions to cultivate resilience. However, even without defining resilience
in its documents, Broward County clearly regarded it as a top priority, often linking the term
to climate change mitigation and adaptation actions. Compared to the other study areas,
Broward’s documents were particularly focused on being able to address anticipated impacts
of climate change, rather than on enhancing flexibility or dealing with uncertainty. Yet, there
were some notable themes across all three communities. For example, common categories for
actions included infrastructure, public policies and programs, land use management, water
supply, natural systems and resources, and education/outreach, illustrating a shared concern
for physical, economic, environmental, and social issues (Beever et al., 2009, 2010; Broward
County Climate Change Task Force, 2010; Broward County, 2015b; SFRCCC, 2012).
During a more in-depth content analysis, other similarities were uncovered. For instance,
forms of the words regulate/policy/law were quite commonly used in close proximity to
the word resilience, demonstrating communities’ reliance on policy solutions for resilience-
building. While there were some calls to establish new policies or laws, the most frequent
policy-related goal was to better coordinate and implement existing policies. Knowing that
these communities all prioritized policy solutions emphasizes the need for more guidance on
how to create policies that can enhance di↵erent types of resilience.
The terms restoration and conservation also occurred proximate to resilience, often in
the context of restoring natural areas and native species or conserving coastal lands to im-
prove resilience. Yet, while conservation or restoration of natural areas along the coast is
often considered a “no regrets” approach to resilience-building, such approaches are only sus-
tainable if paired with other strategies, like inland ecosystem migration, to help ecosystems
maintain their essential functions (Beever et al., 2009; Titus et al., 1991; Volk, 2008). Hence,
there is a balance that must be struck between maintaining current ecosystem functions
and future ones. Water and energy conservation were also very prominent topics linked to
resilience, and were most often addressed through recommendations about maximizing the
e ciency of the built environment.
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On the other hand, social dimensions of resilience – including vulnerable populations,
terms representing social cohesion, and other indicators of human well-being like education
and income – were some of the least frequent topics.
5.2.2 Objective 2: Surrogates for Estimating Resilience in Broward County
To begin the second phase of research (Chapter 3) a review of the academic literature was
conducted to develop a comprehensive list of themes representing various components of
social-ecological resilience. Once this list was developed, a content analysis of newspaper
articles about Hurricane Wilma in Broward County revealed which themes could serve as
forward-looking proxies, or surrogates, for resilience (Berkes and Seixas, 2005; Carpenter
et al., 2005).
Surrogates for resilience in Broward County included benefit-risk distribution, account-
ability, learning and memory, cross-scale and multilevel governance, vulnerability issues, and
social networks. The next section discusses what each of these surrogates revealed about
resilience in Broward County.
5.2.3 Objective 3: Lessons from Hurricane Wilma
Based on the findings from the second phase of research, two major concerns following Hurri-
cane Wilma were the just distribution of costs and benefits and the accountability of powerful
stakeholders. For example, after Wilma some recovery programs were unable to meet the
needs of vulnerable groups, including people who were low-income or non-English speakers.
Yet, while some vulnerable populations were left without recovery assistance, powerful en-
tities like Florida Power and Light were able to pass risks on to customers through a storm
surcharge that included lost revenue from homes and businesses unable to use electricity
during extended outages. Since the purpose of post-disaster recovery assistance is to help
those who cannot help themselves, it seems counterintuitive that wealthier, more powerful
entities should have greater access to recovery assistance.
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Learning and memory and cross-scale governance emerged as interrelated themes dur-
ing the newspaper article analysis. Broward residents have a wealth of context-specific
knowledge about disaster risk and response in their local contexts. As such, the ability to
e ciently harness and share that knowledge within the community is a great opportunity
for resilience-building. Such context-specific knowledge is also invaluable when determining
how to implement policies and programs from higher levels, like state or federal government.
It was also clear that social networks were an essential component of post-disaster
recovery following Wilma. Representatives from Broward County and from the State of
Florida even urged residents to turn to social networks before relying on shelters or other
government recovery assistance. This finding echoed previous research, such as Aldrich
(2010), to support the idea that formally acknowledging the potential role of social networks
in recovery policies is another opportunity to build resilience.
5.2.4 Objective 4: Social Limits to Adaptation
Focus groups conducted for the third phase of research (Chapter 4) had two purposes. First,
discussions with Broward homeowners helped triangulate the findings from data collected in
previous phases. Second, focus group data expanded the inquiry beyond Hurricane Wilma
to discuss perceptions of climate adaptation.
As with the newspaper analysis, social networks emerged as a topic of interest, since
many participants relied on their location-based social networks to meet basic needs follow-
ing Hurricane Wilma. Furthermore, discussions with participants revealed that insurance
practices and risk perceptions were factors that influenced the willingness and ability of
individuals to prepare for and recover from a disaster. Social limits to adaptation among
participants included inaccurate risk perceptions based on past experiences and feelings of
helplessness, and a lack of political trust at the state level. Social resources that can be lever-
aged to enhance adaptive capacity include knowledge reserves of long-term residents, strong
bonding capital, and trust in local, non-elected government employees. The study concludes
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that social dimensions of adaptation, including individuals’ values, beliefs and social norms
can have a powerful influence on the e↵ectiveness of local adaptation planning in the face of
hazards and global environmental change.
5.3 Considerations for Future Work
While the findings of this research are numerous and complement current adaptation and
resilience literature, several opportunities for future research were also revealed. For ex-
ample, three particular topics emerged, which warrant further investigation to determine
their potential impacts on specified and general resilience, and climate adaptation: First,
focus group participants often implicated developers and development boards as a top factor
hindering climate change adaptation in South Florida and beyond; Hence adaptation plan-
ning e↵orts may benefit from a closer investigation of how development policies currently
promote or inhibit climate adaptation. Next, while it was touched upon in Chapter 4 of
this dissertation, the role of insurance practices in forming people’s perceptions of risk could
yield valuable insights about how climate change risks may be perceived, and could be an
important topic for future research. Finally, the role of social networks both in the planning,
response, recovery and redevelopment phases of disturbances need further investigation. In
particular, future research should investigate strategies for formally integrating the role of
social networks into adaptation or recovery plans, or other local policies. Future work about
these three topics would also benefit from the inclusion of additional study areas across a
range of geographic and cultural settings in order to understand how perceptions of resilience
and adaptation compare or contrast.
5.4 Contributions and Broader Impacts
This research contributes to recent scholarship about developing and improving resilience-
building processes in communities with varying capacities to adapt to hazards. Inspired by,
and adapted from, other guidance documents (Gunderson et al., 2010; Florida Department
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of Community A↵airs and Florida Division of Emergency Management, 2010; Community
Resilience Group, 2015a,b), figure 5.1 presents a novel procedural roadmap for community
resiliency planning. While previous guidance documents can serve as useful tools to as-
sess particular elements of the social-ecological system of concern, the resilience roadmap
framework is unique in that it takes a holistic approach to community resilience, integrating
multiple dimensions and time-frames, allowing communities to reflect on their own needs
and capabilities. For instance, the Resilience Alliances practitioner handbook for assessing
community resilience (Gunderson et al., 2010), is particularly useful for stages one and three
of the roadmap, and the NIST community planning guide (Community Resilience Group,
2015a,b) provides excellent insight about creating a more resilient built environment while
considering social needs.
Florida’s Post-Disaster Redevelopment Planning (PDRP) Guidebook takes a similarly
holistic approach to disaster resilience, however, the PDRP process is intended to be carried
out by local government o cials. Alternately, the flexibility of this roadmap would allow
for its use not only by local governments, but also by other concerned groups interested in
facilitating community resilience-building.
This roadmap is intended to serve only as a guide in the creation of a context-specific,
continually updated document to address community resiliency. Because the intended out-
come is a “living document” the steps of this process are not necessarily linear, and users may
move back and forth within the roadmap as necessary. To ensure a high quality resilience
plan, it is essential that each step of the process be informed by sound scientific methods to
produce valid and reliable information about the social and natural systems of concern.
In addition to the roadmap development, the chapters of this dissertation have demon-
strated particular social science methods that can be used throughout the resiliency planning
process to better understand communities’ context-specific needs and values, including how
concerns about immediate, short-term issues can influence longer-term ones. For example,
when developing a locally-relevant vision for resilience, communities could conduct analyses
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Figure 5.1: Process roadmap for community resiliency planning
.
100
of o cial documents to explore how the term has historically been conceptualized. Dur-
ing the research and reflection stage, newspaper article analyses could provide information
about the e ciency of past strategies to build resilience in response to specific disasters, or
in general.
In terms of the broader impacts of this dissertation, the work here addresses key research
needs outlined in the 2014 International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Report and the
2014 U.S. National Climate Assessment, including the need to increase understanding about
adaptation pathways, improve decision support, and enhance understanding of adaptation
as a social process.
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INTRODUCTION 
Thank you for being here today. My name is Hannah and I’m from the University of South Florida. 
You’ll see that there are a couple cameras and audio recorders in the room. We will be recoding this 
meeting just to make sure we don’t miss anything that is said, but don’t let that concern you because 
only the people who are a part of this project have access to the recordings. Your study records will 
always be kept private and confidential. We may publish what we learn from this study, in which case, 
we won't include your name or anything that would let people know who you are. If you are interested 
in being updated about results that come out of this study, please be sure to sign the form I have on the 
front table.
The purpose of this study is to see how Broward County homeowners' trust in sea level rise adaptation 
planning may be influenced by experiences with past disasters, looking most closely at Wilma.  This 
information will help local planners and policymakers better understand and incorporate the concerns 
of community members. I’m going to ask you some questions and then give you all a chance to discuss 
your answers, so please do your best to give everyone a chance to speak. I might ask you to explain 
your answers more or ask additional questions just so I make sure I understand what you mean 
completely.
Your participation is voluntary, so can leave at any time. Potential benefits of participating include 
engaging with other community members who have shared similar experiences to you and having your 
perspectives represented, and the risks include the potential discomfort of recalling these difficult 
experiences. 
Refreshments are on the table (point). When I'm about halfway through my questions we'll take a break
to eat, but feel free to grab a drink before then. Restrooms are (…). 
We’ll probably be here for about an hour or two, so let’s get started.  Because we’ll be recording the 
discussion, please remember to talk one at a time so the recorder can pick up what you are saying.
Any questions?  (If any questions please answer them and then proceed).
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Broward Focus Group Questions
Let’s get started. Remember there are no right or wrong answers. I just want to know what you think!
HURRICANE WILMA
1. What was your most memorable experience during or after Hurricane Wilma (please explain where you 
were)?
2. How did you prepare for the storm?
a. Insurance
b. Shutters
c. Evacuation
d. Probe: Did you expect the storm to be as intense as it was?
3. What kind of damage did you experience or see in your neighborhood afterwards? 
a. Power, water, structural damage (roof, blue tarp)
4. About how long did the damage take to repair?
5. Were there any opportunities for disaster relief (for repairs, other)? From whom?
a. Did you get to take advantage of any of these? 
b. Who did get to take advantage of these?
6. How well do you think your local government met residents' expectations for recovery after Wilma?
7. How well is your local government prepared to keep residents secure if a storm like Wilma hit 
tomorrow?
Now I'd like to switch gears a little to talk about how you think your local government is dealing with a hazard 
of another scale: sea level rise.
SEA LEVEL RISE
8. What concerns you the most regarding the potential effects of sea level rise?
9. What are some ways your local government is preparing for the anticipated impacts of sea level rise 
(including increased storm surge)?
a. In what ways are your local government's actions addressing your concerns?
10. How well do you think they're doing with planning for sea level rise?
a. What do you think is hindering their efforts?
b. OR What do you think is helping them be so successful?
11.  What are you or your neighbors doing to prepare for sea level rise (or thinking about doing)?
a. This could range from elevating or redesigning homes to modifying insurance coverage to 
thinking about moving
12. Where can you go (or who can you reach out to) to find resources and information you'd need to take 
action to prepare for anticipated impacts of sea level rise? 
13. Who do you think should take the lead in responding to this region's coastal hazards?
14. How has Wilma (or other storm experiences) affected the way you feel about your local government's 
ability to keep residents secure against natural hazards?
15. (If time) How would you define a bottom-up [or community-based] approach to adaptation planning? 
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